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Introduction
What sources of legal authority govern the conduct of corporate directors
in Virginia? Many directors and their legal counsel take great comfort from
Virginia's unique and generous statutory standard for director behavior.' This
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. Financial
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author expresses his gratitude for the generosity of Mrs. Robert O. Bentley and that of her late
husband, Mr. Robert O. Bentley.
1. VA. CoDENN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1999).
General standards of conduct for director. -
A. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of
the best interests of the corporation.
B. Unless he has knowledge or information concerning the matter in question
that makes reliance unwarranted, a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial
data, if prepared or presented by.
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standard- that a director must discharge his duties in accordance with his good
faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation - supplied the
legal foundation for WLR Foods' successful resistanceto Tyson Foods' hostile
takeover bid in the mid-1990s.2 The protracted, high-profile WLR Foods
litigation rightly focused national attention on Virginia's director-friendly
corporate laws,3 especially its novel formula for director conduct.4 It would be
both wrong and dangerous, however, to read the holdings in WLR Foods orthe
statutory standard itself as either wholly expounding director duties in Virginia
or creating an unassailable legal warrant for any and all director conduct.
This Article seeks to locate Virginia's powerful director conduct statute -
Virginia Code Annotated § 13.1-690 (Section 690) - inthe larger context of
director duties. The thesis is simple: Notwithstanding the potency of the
statute and the strong reading given to it by the important WLR Foods deci-
sions, directors of Virginia corporations continue to be subject to duties of
care and loyalty outside the statute. These judicially created duties arise in
several illustrative non-WLR Foods settings: the renascent director duty to
monitor corporate affairs and to exercise responsible supervisory oversight;6
1. One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the direc-
tor believes, in good faith, to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
2. Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the
director believes, in good faith, are within the person's professional or expert
competence; or
3. A committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if
the director believes, in good faith, that the committee merits confidence.
C. A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to
take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this
section.
D. A person alleging a violation of this section has the burden of proving the
violation.
Id. An early commentator described Section 690 as "a unique statute nationally." Daniel T.
Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer,20 RICH. L. REV. 67,106 (1985).
2. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 142, 146 (W.D. Va.) (finding
that § 13.1-690 focuses on director's decision-making process rather than substance of direc-
tor's decision), affd, 857 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Va. 1994); WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1994), afl'd, 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995). Constitutional
challenges to Virginia's corporate statutes governing takeovers were rejected in WLR Foods,
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994) (holding that Virginia's corporate
statutes are not preempted and do not violate commerce clause), afd, 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996). This author served as a consultant to legal counsel
for WLR Foods.
3. See, e.g., Jerry E. Whitson, Law Keeps Fox from Hen House, NAT'L L.., Dec. 11,
1995, atB9 (examining WLR Foods decision).
4. Id.
5. See supra note 2 (citing WLR Foods decisions).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 43-59.
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the emergent director duty of disclosure, a duty likely to gain increased stature
in our information-centered investment culture;' the so-called director
"Revlon" duty to obtain the best economic value for shareholders in a corpo-
rate break-up or sale-of-control setting;8 and the venerable director duty of
loyalty,9 applying in a variety of settings to regulate, for example, self-dealing
transactions, unfair competition, and usurpation of corporate opportunities.
By sketching director responsibilities in several common non- WLR Foods
contexts, this Article argues that Section 690 is not the sole source of author-
ity over director conduct. Rather, longstanding common law and equity
principles remain vital supplements to this statutory standard.' ° The upshot
of this thesis is two-fold. First, at a practical level, an appreciation of the
continuing place of common law and equitable precepts in corporate law will
better enable legal counsel to guide client boards in discharging all their legal
duties. Moreover, judges who encounter challenges to director conduct will
appreciate that they continue to possess the richer, adaptive tenets of common
law and equity that are so vital in the review of fiduciary performance.
Second, at a deeper conceptual and policy level, the Article argues that
Virginia's celebrated director conduct statute contains a fundamental defect
in its design. The critical flaw stems from the statute's apparent aim to be a
genergtUy applicable director care statute while it confusingly uses key termi-
nology - "business judgment" - drawn from a judicial review standard that is
designed to operate rather narrowly. Properly understood, director care always
has been a pervasive duty to act at all times in a reasonable and prudent man-
7. See infra Part III.B (discussing director duty of disclosure).
8. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986) (stating that once sale of company becomes inevitable, board of directors has duty to
maximize price for stockholders' equity). The Revlon analysis has been elaborated on and
refined by the Delaware Supreme Court over the years. See, e.g., Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (applying "enhanced scrutiny" to
determine whether directors of corporation fulfilled their fiduciary obligation by seeking best
value reasonably available to stockholders); infra Part IlI.C (discussing Revlon duty).
9. See infra Part MA (discussing director duty of loyalty).
10. Recent judicial pronouncements on the origin and continuing vitality of equity in the
judicial review of corporate director conduct can be found in McMahon v. Newcastle Assocs.,
532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (explaining that fiduciary duty of corporate officers and
directors finds its source in equity) and in Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998)
(detailing meaning of fiduciary duty under Delaware law). Equitable principles, of course,
operate notwithstanding the existence of legal standards, whether those legal standards are set
forth in statutes or other sources. See MYLARGARET HAL U LLEQry AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 6 (1997) ("Fundamental misconceptions of equity abound
because of a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, subversive of
the law."). In Virginia, the role of equity in devising director duties is well-established. See
Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E.2d 633, 642 (Va. 1940) ("We must rely upon general principles of
equity.").
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ner, that is, to act carefully." For various policy reasons, courts will not (and
should not) review the substance of director decisions, but courts may review
the manner in which a board of directors acted or did not act. The judicial
policy of non-review of the substance of business decisions is encapsulated
in the so-called "business judgment rule."' 2 The business judgment rule is
vitally important, but it does not articulate affirmatively or comprehensively
the full contours of the director duty of care. Therefore, for Virginia to pur-
portedly express a pervasive and all-encompassing director duty, that is, care,
in the cramped language of "business judgment" is to formulate confusingly
what purports to be a general director duty through the use of terminology
describing judicial policy toward only one facet of director conduct.
The by-product of Section 690's faulty architecture is a disquieting two-
fold tendency, first, to regard Section 690 as embodying exhaustively a Vir-
ginia director's duty of care and, second, to regard Section 690 as codifying
all director duties, including the quite distinct duty of loyalty.'3 Properly
understood, Section 690 is an important partial expression of a director's
discrete duty of care, and it is no expression at all of a director's duty of
loyalty or any other duty, such as a director duty of disclosure. A June 1999
decision by the Virginia Supreme Court - Willard ex rel. Moneta Building
Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc.4 - embodies the profound mis-
understanding of Section 690's role in Virginia's law of director duties that
this Article decries.
After Parts I and II ofthis Article develop the argument that Section 690
only partially encompasses the director duty of care, Part ImI examines the
Willard opinion and contends that three other crucial director duties - loyalty,
disclosure, Revlon - likewise are not grounded in that section. Instead, those
duties originate in and take ongoing shape from common law and equity. The
11. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed the constant and pervasive nature
of director duty: "[F]iduciary duty does not operate intermittently but is the constant compass
by which all director actions for the corporation and interactions with its shareholders must be
guided." Malone, 722 A-2d at 9. For authoritative recognition that the director duty of care
focuses only on the manner in which a director performs his or her responsibilities and does not
involve examining the substantive wisdom of director decisions, see the Official Comment to
section 8.30 cmt. 2 of the Model Business Corporation Act. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 8.30 cmt. 2, at 8-159 (3d ed. Supp. 1997) (describing director conduct statute as "focusing on
the manner in which the director performs his duties, not the correctness of his decisions").
12. For an explication of the relationship between the director duty of care and the
business judgment rule, see Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24
DEL. 3. Cop. L. (forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Rethinking JudicialReview]; Lyman
Johnson, The ModestBusiness Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter
Johnson, Business Judgment].
13. See inffra Part llA (discussing director duty of loyalty).
14. 515 S.E.2d 277 (Va. 1999), reh 'g denied, July30, 1999.
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overall thrust of the argument is the need for clear thinking about the continu-
ing multiple legal demands on directors of Virginia corporations if Virginia
corporate law is to occupy the place of prominence many seek for it. This
broader-gauged view of director duty is essential to legitimate the power that
corporate directors wield and to assure the well-being of investors and others
that depend on a proper discharge of those duties.
I. The Scope of Virginia's Statutory Standard of Conduct for Directors
Virginia's statutory standard of behavior for directors contains four
parts.15 The first part articulates the applicable standard for director conduct. 6
The second part authorizes directors to rely on specified third parties."' The
third part protects a director from personal liability if he acts in compliance
with the stated standard. 8 The fourth part assigns the burden of proof to the
person who alleges director noncompliance with the stated standard. 9
The heart of the statute is the first part, Section 690(A).2" It mandates
that a director discharge his "duties as a director in accordance with his good
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1999).
16. Id. § 13.1-690(A).
17. Id. § 13.1-690(B).
18. Id. § 13.1-690(C).
19. Id. § 13.1-690(D).
20. Before analyzing the components of the general standard, this Article will make a few
comments about the other three subparts of Section 690 statute. Subsection (B) authorizes
directors to rely on designated persons. See id. § 13.1-690(B); supra note 1. In WLR Foods,
the district court relied heavily on subsection (B) in construing the general standard set forth
in subsection (A). WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 492, 494 (W.D. Va.
1994). Seeking to give meaning to the phrase "good faith business judgment" found in the
general conduct standard, the district court held that proper director reliance under subsection
(B) was one way - "something of a safe harbor" - for a director to fulfill the general standard.
Id. Two points about this holding are important First, although the WLR Foods court offered
one way for directors to act in good faith, the court did not provide an exclusive interpretation
of that key phrase. Id. Second, by its own terms, subsection (B) does not allow director reli-
ance when the director has "knowledge or information" that makes "reliance unwarranted." VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B). The Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted that phrase in a way
that makes it a meaningful constraint on "blind" director reliance. See Commonwealth Transp.
Comm'r v. Mateyiko, 481 S.E.2d 468, 471-72 (Va. 1997) (finding directors personally liable
when they voted to distribute corporate assets upon dissolution because they had knowledge that
condemnation award would probably be less than amount to be distributed under "drawdown"
order, thereby making reliance unwarranted); see also infra note 154.
Subsection (C) expressly absolves a director of personal liability if he complies with the
general standard of conduct § 13.1-690(C); see supra note 1. Necessarily, if directors comply
with the stated standard of conduct, their actions themselves also should be free of attack. The
Fourth Circuit so held in WLR Foods. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172,
1183 (4th Cir. 1995).
Subsection (D) assigns the burden of proof in the conventional manner in litigation.
§ 13.1-690(D); see supra note 1. Although the statute uses the more general burden of proof
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faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation." 2l The "du-
ties" referred to in Section 690(A) include those identified in Section 673,
captioned "Requirement for and duties of board of directors."22  Section
673(B), in essence, describes the board of directors as the decision-making
body possessing plenary authority over all corporate powers and also as the
body charged with directing the management ofthe business and affairs ofthe
corporation.' The "duties" referred to in Section 690, then, encompass all
facets of directing the management of a corporation's business and affairs.
Consequently, the standard of conduct set forth in Section 690 would seem to
apply pervasively to all facets of director behavior.
Notwithstanding the apparent intended breadth of Section 690(A) - that
a director shall discharge all Section 673 duties in conformance to the statu-
tory standard - the section goes on to mandate that those duties be discharged
in a way that radically limits the breadth of its application. The statute
requires a director to act in accordance with "his good faith business judg-
ment ...... ,,24 An obvious and critical interpretive question under this statute
is its application to a director who, for good reasons or bad, does not exercise
a "business judgment." The WLR Foods decisions did not address this basic
issue because the WLR Foods board of directors undisputably exercised
business judgment. The board exercised such judgment both in rejecting as
inadequate an unsolicited takeover bid from Tysons Foods and in taking
certain defensive measures to support that underlying business decision.'
language rather than the more specific burden of production and burden of persuasion terminol-
ogy, both of the latter burdens should be encompassed within the statute's language and
assigned to the complainant The key function of subsection (D) in a change of control or
hostile takeover defensive measure setting is to avoid in Virginia the Delaware rule assigning
to directors a two-part threshold burden of proof that they had "reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and that the director response was
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A2d
946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). Fortuitously, it also avoids application in Virginia of the disturbing
Delaware holding that, in certain duty of care situations, directors bear the burden of proving
the "fairness" of their conduct. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162-63
(Del. 1995) (applying two prong "entire fairness" standard when presumption of business
judgment rule had been rebutted). For a recent critique of Delaware law on this last point, see
generally Johnson, Rethinking JudicialReview, supra note 12. In Virginia, as to conduct within
the scope of Section 690, directors have no such Unocal or Cinerama burden of proof. As to
conduct outside the scope of the statute, however, such as a director self-dealing transaction,
the burden may shift to directors in accordance with other applicable statutory, common law,
or equitable principles. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Michie 1999).
22. Id. § 13.1-673.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 13.1-690(A).
25. See supra note 2 (citing WLR Foods cases).
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Consequently, the WLR Foods opinions are important both for what they did
and for what they did not do.
The WLR Foods holdings provide guidance that is key to conducting pre-
trial discovery in the context of a board decision not to sell corporate control.
More generally, the holdings construe Section 690 as essentially a process-
oriented statute designed to accord substantial deference to board judgments.26
In this vein, the district court reasoned that Section 690's rejection of a
"reasonableness" standard in favor of a simple "good faith" standard "signals
legislative rejection of a substantive evaluation of director conduct, that is,
evaluation in terms of rationality of the conduct."27 According to the court,
the key statutory phrase "good faith" means a director's subjective good faith,
measured not by the rationality of the decision ultimately made but by the
"procedural indicia of whether the directors resorted in good faith to an in-
formed decision-making process. "' A key component of good board practice
in the business judgment context is found in the statute's authorization of
director reliance on experts," a feature heavily relied on in the court's
process-oriented construction of Section 690.30
Important as the WLRFoods litigation was in the hostile takeover setting,
specifically in the context of a "no sale" decision by a target company board
of directors, it simply did not address other key interpretive issues that Section
690 raises. One portion of the statute's terminology not addressed in WLR
Foods is the pivotal phrase "business judgment." Linguistically, the statute
specifies that a director "shall" discharge all duties in accordance with his
good faith "business judgment."31 One possible interpretation, then, is that a
director who does not exercise a judgment at all, whether for reasons he or
anybody else deems to be good or bad, has violated automatically the mandate
that he act in accordance with his good faith business judgment. One simply
cannot have acted in accordance with a particular standard for judgment -
"good faith business" judgment- if no judgment whatsoever is exercised.
This interpretation, however, means that any and all directors not making
business judgments as to matters concerning the business and affairs of a
26. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 492, 493 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(construing § 13.1-690 to apply only to process by which business decisions are made).
27. Id. at494.
28. Id.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (Michie 1999) (listing classes of persons on whose
opinions director may rely).
30. The district court in WLR Foods sought to give content to the phrase "good faith
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation" - the standard set forth in Section
690(A) - by stating that "for the most part, the statute provides this indicia in Subsection B
which creates something of a safe harbor for directors who rely on competent advice. § 13.1-
690(B)." WLRFoods, 857 F. Supp. at 494.
31. VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-690(A).
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corporation necessarily violate the statutory standard of conduct. This strict
liability reading would encompass not only nonfeasant directors who did not
make a business judgment because they were "asleep at the switch," it would
also include vigilant directors who did not make a business judgment about
a particular matter because they believed, by some standard, that the matter
did not even warrant the exercise of judgment. An example of an inept
director might be a director who in 1999 made no judgment concerning a
corporation's preparedness for Y2K issues. An example of a possibly vigilant
director might be a generally very conscientious director who in 1990 made
no judgment concerning a corporation's preparedness for Y2K because he did
not then believe - wrongly, to be sure, as it turns out - that the particular
technological issue even existed much less required action. Both the inept and
the diligent directors could be said to violate the statutory standard simply by
failing to exercise judgment at all. Such violations occur without regard to
whether, by reference to some other nonstatutory standard, the particular non-
exercise of judgment in the one case is thought to be very foolish although, in
the other case, the same behavior is quite understandable.
This interpretive difficulty of overinclusiveness can be sidestepped by
construing the word "judgment" not as a mandate that judgment must be
exercised to avoid violating the statute per se, but as a necessary predicate for
triggering application of the statute. In other words, the statute is best con-
strued as covering only that subset of director conduct involving the actual
exercise of business judgment. This would include, to be sure, a deliberate
judgment not to take action as well as a judgment to take a particular action.
The former is covered because Section 690(C) provides that a director is not
liable for "failure to take any action" if, importantly, "he performed his duties
in compliance with this section [Section 690(A)]."32 Section 690(A), as just
seen, however, requires the exercise of "judgment." Consequently, a director
who fails to take action because he did not exercise judgment does not fall
under Section 690(C) because, contrary to Section 690(C)'s requirement that
such a director perform "in compliance with this section," he did not exercise
the "judgment" required by Section 690(A). In this reading of Section 690's
scope, a director's nonfeasance (or passive negligence) falls outside the
statute's coverage when such stance does not reflect the deliberate exercise
of judgment to adopt such a stance.
This interpretation finds support in commentary to the analogous sec-
tion - section 8.30 - of the Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act).
33
The Model Act states that the statute applies to any "conscious consider-
ation of matters 3 and does not apply only "when the director has failed to
32. Id. § 13.1-690(C).
33. MoDEL Bus. CORP. AcTANN. § 8.30 cmt 2, at 8-159 (3d ed. 1996).
34. Id. at 8-164.
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consider taking action which under the circumstances he is obliged to consider
taking."3 s The Virginia Bar Association commentary to Section 690 is confus-
ing on this point because it both refers to the above-quoted very clear Model
Act commentary and states that Section 690 does applyto "conduct generally,
including passive non-conduct." '36 The latter comment in the Virginia com-
mentary is wrong in that it cites as authority Section 690(C),37 which, as seen
above, protects a failure to take action only if, in failing to act, the standard
of Section 690(A) is met, a standard predicated on the actual exercise of
"judgment.0
8
The Model Act, interestingly, does not narrowly mandate that a director
exercise "business judgment." Rather, prior to being amended in 1998, it
articulated the director care standard inthe far-reaching terms of "prudent" and
"reasonable" behavior and, after changes in 1998, relies broadly on "reason-
ableness" alone.39 Thus, a nonfeasant director who does not act in a way that
35. Id.
36. Joint Bar Committee, Commentary on Virginia Code Commission's Proposed
Revision of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, Report of the Virginia Code Comm'n on the
Revision of Chapters 1 and 2 of Title 13.1 of the Code of Virginia to the Governor and the
General Assembly of Virginia, . Doc. No. 13, app. 4 at 250 (1985) [hereinafter Report of the
Virginia Code Commission].
37. The Bar Association Commentary, found in Report of the Virginia Code Commission
states: "Section 13.1-690 applies to conduct generally, including passive non-conduct. Subsec-
tion C reflects this by providing that a director does not become liable for any action taken as a
director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance
with this section." Id. As indicated, however, the key to coming within coverage of subsection
(C) is that a director comply with subsection (A) of Section 690, which requires the exercise of
"judgment." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A), (C) (Michie 1999). Therefore, "passive non-con-
duct" does not comply with Section 690(C) because it does not comply with Section 690(A). Id.
38. § 13.1-690(A), (C).
39. Section 8.30 of the Model Business CorporationAct was amended on June 13,1998.
Both the pre-June 13, 1998 version and the June 13, 1998 version are set forth below:
§ 8.30. General Standards for Directors [as in effect prior to June 13, 1998].
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if pre-
pared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director
reasonably lzelieves are within the person's professional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
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a "prudent" or "reasonable" director would act nonetheless can be said both
to be within the coverage ofthe Model Act andto violate it. Therefore, under
the Model Act and the statutes of the approximately three dozen states that
more or less follow its design,4 a director who does not exercise judgment on
a matter in which a "reasonable" director would exercise judgment violates the
codified standard. Because Virginia's standard of conduct, by way of con-
trast, is couched uniquely in terms of'Judgment," a director who fails to decide
deliberately not to take an action cannot be within coverage of the statute
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter
in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.30 (3d ed. 1996). The following provision was proposed in
1997 and accepted in 1998. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in theModelBusiness
Corporation Act - Amendments Pertaining to Electronic Filing/Standards of Conduct and
Standards ofLiabliftyfor Directors, 53 Bus. Law. 157, 160-61 (1997) [hereinafter Committee
on Corporate Laws, Amendment] (proposing amendment to § 8.30); Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation ActPertaining to the Standards ofLiabiliy
forDirectors-FinaAdoption, 53 Bus. Law. 813 (1998) (adopting amendments to § 8.30).
§ 8.30. General ConductforDirectors [as adopted on June 13, 1998].
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director,
shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becom-
ing informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention
to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
(c) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not have knowl-
edge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on the performance by any of
the persons specified in subsection (e)(1) or subsection (e)(3) to whom the board may
have delegated, formally or informally by course of conduct, the authority or duty to
perform one or more of the board's functions that are delegable under applicable law.
(d) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not have knowl-
edge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared
or presented by any of the persons specified in subsection (e).
(e) A director is entitled to rely, in accordance with subsection (c) or (d), on:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the functions performed or the
information, opinions, reports or statements provided;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons retained by the corporation
as to matters involving skills or expertise the director reasonably believes are matters
(i) within the particular person's professional or expert competence or (ii) as to which
the particular person merits confidence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a member
if the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
Committee on Corporate Laws,Amendment, supra, at 160-61.
40. Id. § 8.30, at 8-166 to 8-167.
MSUNDERSTANDING DIRECTOR DUTIES
because, in failing to exercise "judgment,"'" necessarily he failed to comply
with the predicate of the statute.
This technical interpretive issue is of immense importance for two
reasons. First, if Section 690 applies only if a director exercises judgment, an
additional non-statutory standard of care must exist to evaluate the propriety
of director behavior falling outside the statute's coverage, unless nonfeasance
or abdication of responsibilities by Virginia directors is not actionable. This
additional source of authority is the common-law duty of care.4' This duty of
care is longstanding in Virginia and, after adoption of Section 690, governs
all director responsibilities not involving the exercise of considered judgment.
Indeed, most decisions that a corporation's numerous agents make are not the
subject of considered director attention 43 but are made deeper within the
organization. Yet a corporation's financial and legal welfare depends vitally
on proper director oversight of this organizational complexity. This means
that the common law duty of care still provides the applicable standard of
conduct for directors who do not exercise judgment with respect to this
sizable domain of responsibility. Consequently, Section 690(A) is a partial,
not exhaustive, expression of the manner in which Virginia directors are to
discharge their far-reaching Section 673 duties.
Second, the scope of director responsibilities to which Section 690 may
not apply because judgment is not exercised is growing in significance.
Although negligence in failing to monitor carefully the business and affairs
of a corporation long has been a theoretical concern,44 this issue received
renewed attention as a result of an important 1996 Delaware Chancery Court
decision, In re Caremark International, Inc.4" This decision approved the
settlement of a shareholder derivative action against directors for negligence
in carrying out their oversight responsibilities concerning federal and state
41. The necessity ofjudgment being exercised before the "business judgment" rule, or in
Virginia's case a "business judgment" statute, can operate was made plain by the Delaware
Supreme Court- "The business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action.
Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or
absent a conscious decision, failed to act" Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984)
(footnote omitted); see Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that
application of business judgment rule first requires showing that informed director actually
made business judgment).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 64-75.
43. This point was made by then-Chancellor William Allen in In re Caremark Int'l, Inc.,
698 A.2d 959,968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
44. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Observation: Corporate Director's Accountability:
The Race to theBottom- The SecondLap, 66 N.C. L. RLrv. 171 (1987) (examining state statutes
protective of director's personal liability).
45. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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health law violations committed by subordinates.16 Chancellor Allen, discuss-
ing a director's duty of care under Delaware law, stated that director "liability
to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure
of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention, would, arguably,
have prevented the loss."47 Moreover, abandonment of oversight responsibili-
ties may be not only a breach of the director duty of care but also a breach of
the stricter duty of loyalty.4
Numerous recent high-profile lapses of director oversight49 and the
reasoning of Caremark have prompted a growing body of commentary spot-
lighting the increased risk ofpersonal liability that corporate directors face for
failing to discharge their duty to direct, or to oversee, the business and affairs
of a corporation."0 Notable among director oversight responsibilities is the
duty to monitor a corporation's compliance with various regulatory regimes
governing its activities. These regulatory regimes include securities laws that
46. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972 (approving settlement and stating that settlement was
adequate, reasonable and beneficial outcome for all parties).
47. See id. at 967 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
48. The Delaware Supreme Court once described the conduct of disinterested directors
who had abandoned their oversight responsibilities as a breach of their duties of care and
loyalty. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillanlne., 559 A-2d 1261, 1281-84 & n.32 (Del.
1988) (explaining that although board of directors may rely on expert opinion, it may not avoid
direct and active role in oversight of significant matters). Even without director self-interest,
such abdication so fundamentally violates director duty to the intended recipients of director
attention - i.e., the corporate enterprise and its shareholders - that it might constitute director
disloyalty. See infra Part III.A.
49. Such illustrious corporations as General Motors, Archer Daniels Midland, W.R.
Grace, IBM, AT&T, Morrison Knudsen, and Kidder Peabody, among many others, have exper-
ienced various crises as a result of inattentive boards of directors. For a description of certain
of these lapses, see Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and
Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885,889-90 & n.15 (1999); and see also In re Caremark,
698 A.2d 959, 968-69 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting management failure to monitor at Kidder Pea-
body and others).
50. See, e.g., NACD BESTPRACTICES COIrNCILNATIONALASS'NOF CORPORATE DiRS.,
COPING w1THFRAUD AND OTHER ILLEGALACT1=vrY (1998) (suggesting steps directors can take
to avoid liability); John Gibeault, Getting Your House in Order, A.BA. J., June 1999, at 64
(discussing implications of Caremark); Mark Kessel, Building a Better Audit Committee, Bus.
L. TODAY, JanJFeb. 1999, at 5 (discussing oversight duties of audit committee); Frances A.
MeMorris, Employers Face Greater Liability in Race Cases, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1999, at BI
(discussing employer liability for racial harassment in light of recent Supreme Court cases);
Richard A. Rosen, Corporate Governance in the 1990's, DIREcTOR's MONTHLY, June 1997, at
5 (noting possible director liability for use of derivative products, violation of environmental
laws, insider trading, failure to institute compliance program, and violation of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act); E. Norman Veasey, Directors and the Dynamics ofDelaware Corporation Law,
DIREcTOR's MONTHLY, Nov. 1997, at I (discussing director duties of oversight and disclosure);
Christine B. Whelan, EEOC Issues Liability Guidelines on Workplace Harassment, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 1999, at B25 (noting guidelines' implications for employer liability).
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prohibit insider securities trading,"1 environmental laws, 2 product safety
regulations, 3 employee relations laws (including the recent worrisome issue
of employer vicarious liability for employee-on-employee sexual, racial, and
other protected category harassment),54 health and safety regulations, 5 finan-
51. Several legal regimes regulate insider trading. These include: The Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(aXl), 78ff(a) (1994) (establishing sanctions for
insider trading and civil liability for false or misleading statements in SEC filings); § 1Ob of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1999) (prohibiting fraud in sale or purchase
of securities); § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994)
(allowing issuer to recover profits from insider trading); and Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Rule 14e-3 promulgated under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3 (1999) (prohibiting insider trading in context of tender offers). In addition, the so-
called "misappropriation theory" under SEC Rule lob-5 and state common law also govern
insider trading. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that
person who traded securities by using misappropriated information was in violation of SEC
rules); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969) (holding directors liable in
derivative action for profits realized from use of misappropriated information); STEPHEN M.
BAiNBRIDGE, SEcuPnEs LAW: INIsDER TRADiNG (1999) (setting out state and federal statutory
and common law prohibitions on insider trading).
52. See, e.g., Toxic Substances ControlAct of 1976,15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); Oil
Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994) (imposing liability for oil spills); Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994) (establishing air quality regulations); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994)
(establishing sanctions for release of hazardous substances); Pollution Prevention Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13102 (1994); Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-580 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (regulating treatment,
storage, and disposal of hazardous waste); Virginia Environmental Regulations, 9 VA. ADMIN.
CODE (1996) (establishing environmental standards).
53. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-6004 (1995) (including inter alia Consumer Product
Safety Act) (regulating flammable fabrics); 42 U.S.C. §§ 283-6601 (1995) (establishing
National Institutes of Health); Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-196 to 59.1-207 (Michie 1999) (promoting fair and ethical standards for dealings
between consumers and suppliers).
54. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963,29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994) (prohibiting employers
from paying unequal wages based on gender); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994) (encouraging employment of individuals with disabilities); Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964) (setting out Title VII, dealing with discrimination); Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against
individuals with disabilities); Equal Opportunity Commission Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600
to 1691 (1998) (establishing employee ethical conduct standards).
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held that employers are subject to vicarious liability for
unlawful sexual harassment by supervisors. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 724 (1998); see generally B. Glenn George, Em-
ployer Liabilily for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops Where?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1999). On June 18, 1999, the EEOC promulgated guidelines on the subject of vicarious
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cial reporting practices and standards,16 antitrust laws," Federal Sentencing
Guidelines,5" and others.
In short, Virginia directors who do not deliberately exercise judgment
concerning the discharge of their oversight responsibilities, and thereby fail
to ensure corporate compliance with applicable legal regimes, will not fall
within the generous protection of Section 690 and the deferential process-
oriented reading given to that statute by WLR Foods. This result means that
legal counsel to Virginia boards of directors should highlight this issue for
their clients and strongly urge client boards to study and implement measures
to monitor and report on their corporations' compliance with applicable legal
regimes and other governing standards of sound business performance. The
latter might include director attention to a range of issues including assurance
of computer security and safeguarding of electronic data privacy, as well as,
for example, the propriety of and guidelines for overseeing the use of deriva-
tive financial products as part of a risk management strategy.59 In other
words, the board should exercise good faith business judgment aimed at
establishing a well-functioning internal information and reporting system. By
deliberately and regularly attending to, and exercising business judgment on,
all those matters touching the direction of a corporation's "business and
affairs," the deferential protection of Section 690 will apply. Without the
exercise of such judgment, however, the legal consequences of director non-
employer liability for unlawful harassment. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Em-
ployer Liabilityfor Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.
gov/doesharassment.html>. A recent Virginia federal district court case addressing employer
liability for sexual harassment, rendered prior to the most recent promulgation of EEOC Guide-
lines, is Pritchard v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., Inc., No. 7:98 CVO 536,1999 VWL 397910 (W.
D. Va. Mar. 5, 1999).
55. See, e.g., Occupational Health and SafetyAct of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1994); Occupational Health and Safety Administration Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-1990
(1998); Labor and Employment Safety Regulations, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-44.1 to 40.1-
51.4:4 (Michie 1999).
56. See, e.g.,AUDrrNGSTANDARDSBD.,AMERICANINST. OFCERTIFIEDPUBUCACCOUN-
TANTS, CONSIDERATIONOFFRAuDINAFINANCIALSTATEmENTAUDT: STATEMENT ONAUDIT-
ING STANDARDS 82 (Feb. 1997).
57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994) (including inter alia Sherman Act); Virginia
Antitrust Act, VA. CODEANN. § 59.1-9.1 to 59.1-9.17.
58. See SentencingReformActof1984,18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 (1994); UNiTED STATES
SENTENCING COMMIssION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (Nov. 1994); see also F. Joseph Warin &
Jason C. Schwartz, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Component ofPlea Agreements and
Civil andAdministrative Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71 (1998).
59. See, e.g., Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct App. 1992) (holding directors
liable for failure to supervise management hedging). For a full treatment of the director liability





action in the monitoring area will be measured by director compliance with
Virginia's judge-made duty of care. What is the scope of that duty?
I. Virginia's Non-Statutory Standard of Care for Directors
In Virginia, as seen above, two sources of authority govern a director's
duty of care, Section 690 when director business judgment is exercised and
common law (or equity) when business judgment is not exercised. Certain
judicial statements that assert the exclusivity of Section 690, therefore, are
faulty. For example, in FDIC v. Cohen,6" the district court for the Southern
District of New York completely misstated the relationship between Section
690 and the common law duty of care when it said that "the fiduciary duty of
care does not survive §13.1-690 . ,..61 The court's overly broad statement
treats the duty of care as subsumed entirely within Section 690 although the
former continues to govern directors outside the limited business judgment
context of Section 690. Also, in the recent Virginia Supreme Court decision
of Willard ex rel. Moneta Building Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Building Supply,
Inc., the court stated wrongly that Section 690(A) "does not abrogate the
common law duties of a director. It does, however, set the standard by which
a director is to discharge those duties."'62 The latter statement is accurate only
as to conduct within the coverage of Section 690, that is, conduct involving
the exercise of deliberate judgment. The statement is inaccurate, however, as
to director conduct falling outside the scope of Section 690. As to conduct
outside the scope of Section 690, the common law duty of care still sets "the
standard by which a director is to discharge those duties."6
In Virginia, courts frequently have set out the director's common-law
duty of care. For example, in Winston v. Gordon,' the Virginia Supreme
Court stated that directors are "responsible for the exercise of reasonable care
in the performance of their duties."6 InAnderson v. Bundy,' the court elab-
orated on the meaning of "reasonable care" by stating that it meant asking
whether directors had conducted corporate affairs as "might reasonably be
expected of ordinarily prudent [directors]." '67
60. No. 95 CIV 683 (LLS), 1996 WL 87248, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 1996).
61. FDIC v. Cohen, No. 95 CIV 683 (US), 1996 WL 87248, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
1996).
62. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d
277,284 (Va. 1999).
63. Id.
64. 80 S.E. 756 (Va. 1914).
65. Winston v. Gordon, 80 S.E. 756,761 (Va. 1914).
66. 171 S.E. 501 (Va. 1933).
67. Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501,507 (Va. 1933).
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A 1935 Virginia decision, O'Connor v. First National Investors' Corp.
of Virginia,6" like the more recent Caremark decision in Delaware, is an
instructive reminder of the standards that apply to modem Virginia directors
who abdicate their duty to oversee and monitor corporate business and affairs.
O'Connor involved a stockholder negligence claim against the directors of an
investment corporation for failing to supervise the investment activities of the
president.69 The president converted to his personal use and grossly misman-
aged corporate assets, and the stockholders sought to hold the directors liable
for damages resulting from their breach of care.7"
Discussing the applicable standard of conduct, the Virginia Supreme
Court stated that corporate directors "implicitly undertake to use as much
diligence and care as the proper performance of the duties of their office
requires."71 As to director supervision over management activities, the court
quoted approvingly from authorities stating that directors had a duty of
maintaining "reasonable supervision."72 The court rejected as inconsistent
with that duty the defense that none of the directors had any reason to suspect
that the president was misusing assets,73 observing that such wrongdoing
would have been prevented had the directors conducted even an occasional
audit.74 Applying a negligence standard, the court held all directors jointly
and severally liable, some for failing entirely to discharge their duties as direc-
tors and others for failing to discover what easily could have been discovered
by the exercise of ordinary care.7"
Although decided in 1935, the O'Connor decision remains sound and
instructive in the increasingly critical area of director monitoring and over-
sight responsibilities. Its language requiring directors to maintain "reasonable
supervision" conforms with Chancellor Allen's sobering 1996 reminder in
Caremark that directors have an
obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation,... [and
that directors' obligations include] assaringthemselves thatinformation and
reporting systems exist in the organizationthat are reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its
68. 177 S.E. 852 (Va. 1935).
69. O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 177 S.E. 852, 857 (Va. 1935) (quoting
Marshall v. F&M Savings Bank, 8 S.E. 586,590 (Va. 1889)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 857-59.
73. Id. at 858.
74. Id. at 859; see Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946,949 (4th Cir. 1964)
(asserting directors' liability for failing to discover questionable loans) (citing O'Connor)).
75. O'Connor, 177 S.E. at 860.
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scope, to reach informed judgment concerning both the corporation's
compliance with law and itsbusiness performance... and that failure to do
so under some circumstances may, intheoryatleast, renderadirector liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.'
The 0 'Connor decision, impliedly, and the more recent Caremark opin-
ion, explicitly, cast serious doubt on the wisdom and force of the renowned
1961 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing." Inthat case, the Delaware court ruled that, absent actual cause for
suspicion, in Delaware 'There is no aluty upon the directors to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
have no reason to suspect exists.""8  The Chancery Court's decision in
Caremark strongly suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court probably would
not follow Allis-Chalmers today and, further, might articulate a simple negli-
gence standard for director care in the oversight (as opposed to the business
judgment) context.79 As interesting and important as this question is for
directors and legal counsel representing Delaware corporations, in Virginia
O'Connor establishes negligence as the standard for director care in the
oversight context.
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance and
the American Bar Association's Corporate Director's Guidebook also high-
light the importance of the director's duty of prudent care in the oversight
context.8" As expressed by the American Law Institute:
One aspect of the board's general duty of care obligation in the oversight
and inquiry areas is an affirmative obligation of directors to be reasonably
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of procedures, programs,
and other techniques... to assist the board in overseeing the corporation's
business .... Today an ordinarily prudent person serving as director of a
corporation of any significant scale or complexity should recognize the
need to be reasonably concerned with the existence and effectiveness of
76. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A-2d 959,970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
77. 188 A-2d 125 (Del. 1963).
78. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 188 A-2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
79. The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Honorable E. Norman Veasey,
believes the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether simple
negligence or gross negligence is the proper liability standard for directors in the oversight
context, as opposed to the business judgment context. E. Norman Veasey, Directors and the
Dynamics of Delaware Corporation Law, DnECTO's MONTHLY, Nov. 1997, at 3 (casting
doubt on Allis-Chalmers by suggesting directors must institute reporting system to satisfy
obligation to be informed).
80. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRiNcmmEs OF CORPORATE GOVERXANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter PRINCILES]; COMMrrTE ON CORPORATE LAWS,
AMERucANBARAss'N, CORPORATEDmEcToR'sG.UDEBOOK(1994),repintedin49BUS.LAW.
1243 (1994) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDMEBOOK].
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procedures, programs, and other techniques to assist the board in its over-
sight role....
There are no set formulas for oversight techniques that could be used
across theboard. The size of abusiness, the diversity ofits operations, and
numerous similar factors will influence the nature and extent of the over-
sight techniques that would be appropriate. For example no programs or
procedures may be necessary in a very small closely held corporation; in
large closelyheld corporations, however, extensive programs orprocedures
maybe needed."'
The American Bar Association addressed director monitoring as follows:
Compliance with Law. Does the corporation have appropriate policies
directed to compliance withapplicable laws andregulations? For example,
when appropriate, does the board receive periodic reports regarding com-
pliance with environmental laws, including estimates of the costs of envi-
ronmental compliance?
Employees shouldbeinformedofcorporatepolicies directedto compli-
ancewithapplicable laws, includingpersonnelpolicies designedto comply
with health and safety, antidiscrimination and employment laws, and the
securities laws, particularlythoseprohibitinginsidertrading. The corpora-
tion should establish appropriate procedures for monitoring compliance.
All persons involved in the compliance process should have direct access
to the general counsel or a designee so that sensitive compliance matters
may be raised for consideration.n
These statements - made earlier in the 1990s - take on even greater signifi-
cance in today's climate of renewed attention to director oversight.
8 3
Specifically with regard to Virginia, Section 690 supplies the applicable
standard of conduct - good faith business judgment - in those contexts in
which deliberate business judgments are made. This includes judgments as to
the nature and extent of oversight techniques appropriate for a particular
corporation. The common law, however, supplies the applicable standard of
director conduct - reasonable care, a negligence standard - in those contexts
in which deliberate judgment is not exercised. This distinction, moreover,
conforms with good policy. The deferential standard found in Section 690
fulfills the laudable purpose of according directors wide latitude in exercising
judgment, both in protecting the decision itself and in sparing directors expo-
sure to personal liability.84 Such deference induces talented persons to serve
81. PRINCIPES, supra note 80, § 4.01, at 164-66.
82. CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 80, at 1251.
83. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
84. In the WLR Foods litigation, the Fourth Circuit held that board of director compliance
with Section 690 not only protects directors against personal liability, it also serves to uphold
board decisions themselves against injunctive attack. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
65 F.3d 1172,1183 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996).
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as directors, encourages both desirable business risk-taking and explicit super-
visory attention to potential corporate trouble spots, and maintains a healthy
barrier to public sector second-guessing of private sector director actions."
None of these policy rationales - precisely the rationales undergirding
the business judgment rule86 - obtains when directors do not exercise deliber-
ate judgment, whether intentionally or negligently, totally or in part. Directors
who not only fail to attend explicitly to corporate business and affairs by
exercising judgment, but also fail to comply with the common-law default
standard of behaving as "might reasonably be expected of ordinarily prudent
[directors],"" exhibit none of the qualities sound law should encourage.
Section 690 therefore will not shelter director abdication or negligence in the
important area of overseeing or monitoring corporate business and affairs.
Instead, such behavior should lead, as in O'Connor, to director liability for all
resulting losses.
II. Other Non-Statutory Duties of Directors
This Article's hard look at Section 690 reveals that there is more to a
director's duty of care than what is set forth in the frail requirements of that
statute. This point will now be generalized by arguing that other director
duties in Virginia likewise are not cabined within the slender confines of
Section 690. These duties include the duty of loyalty, the duty of disclosure,
and possibly a so-called "Revlon" duty to maximize share price in a corporate
break-up or sale-of-control transaction.8" The existence of multiple demands
on directors of Virginia corporations stems from Section 690 having a much
narrower compass than many imagine.
A. Duty ofLoyalty
Inasmuch as the duty of loyalty in Virginia, as elsewhere, originated as a
judge-made duty,89 two important rules of construction come into play where
a statute - here, Section 690 - is claimedto be in derogation of such decisional
law. First, "[t]he common law is not to be considered as altered or changed by
statute unless the legislative intent be plainly manifested."9" Second, "[s]tatutes
85. The policy rationales underlying judicial deference to director decision making are
further elaborated on in Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review, supra note 12.
86. See generally id.
87. Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501,507 (Va. 1933).
88. See supra note 8 (citing Revlon); infra Part IHA (discussing director duty of loyalty);
infra Part III.B (explaining director duty of disclosure); infra Part DI.C (considering Revlon
duty).
89. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
90. Hannabass v. Ryan, 180 S.E. 416,418 (Va. 1935).
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in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be
enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms."'" An
examination of both "legislative intent" and the "express terms" of Section
690 reveals that the section addresses only director care, not loyalty.
The language ofthe statute itself says nothing about loyalty. The standard
set forth in the statute - good faith business judgment - is not the standard
applied to director loyalty but instead closely resembles the standard used to
review director care when business judgment has been exercised. Furthermore,
the commentary to Section 690 declares that the section is designed to treat -
differently to be sure - the "same subject" that section 8.30 of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act addresses. 2 The commentary to section 8.30(a) clearly
states thatthe section "establishes ageneral standard of care for all directors."'93
The commentary also frequently - and exclusively - refers to the duty or
standard of "care."94 Not a word is said in either section, or in either commen-
tary, about loyalty or any other director duty. Therefore, the subject matter of
both section 8.30 and Section 690 is care and only care. Consequently, all of
the following statements about the ambit of Section 690 are wrong:
In other words, Section 690 imposes a duty of loyalty.95
But the underpinnings for Code Section 13.1-690 includes [sic] both the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.96
The duty of loyalty ... is essentially the same duty that is prescribed in
section 13.1-690 .... Section 13.1-690 does not foreclose the claims of
breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty... because that duty is essentially the
same as the duty prescribed by Section 13.1-690 .... 97
[Defendants] discharged their duty of loyalty in compliance with Code
§ 13.1-690.18
91. C&O Ry. v. Kinzer, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. 1965); see Hyman v. Glover, S.E.2d
269, 271 (Va. 1986) (asserting more recently that statutes contrary to common law receive
narrow construction (citing Hannabuss and Kinzer)).
92. Report of the Virginia Code Commission, supra note 36, at 248; see, e.g., Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 145 (N.J. 1979) (approving interpretation of
statute by examining statute from another jurisdiction from which it was copied).
93. MoDE.LBus. CORP. AcTANN. § 8.30(a), at 8-10 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended and Supplemental Class Action Complaint at 5, Feldman v. Cohen, No. 98
CIV. 3789 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
96. ALLEN C. GOOLSBY, VIRGIA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.8, at 122.9
(Supp. 1998).
97. FDIC v. Cohen, No. 95 CIV. 683 (LLS), 1996 WL 87248, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
29, 1996).
98. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d
277,287 (Va. 1999).
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In Virginia, the director duty of loyalty remains a matter of decisional
law.9 The Virginia Supreme Court has stated plainly that under general
principles of equity - the root source of director fiduciary duties - corporate
directors "owe[ ] a loyalty to their trust which [i]s superior to their personal
interests.""° Although relatively few Virginia decisions address loyalty, it is
clear that courts have strictly scrutinized classic self-dealing and conflict of
interest transactions by directors. The policy behind doing so is to "secure
fidelity in the director. 10' Indeed, Virginia so severely disapproved of director
self-dealing transactions that they were voidable at common law, notwith-
standing the presence of good faith and adequacy of price."° A director may
transact with his corporation when he has a direct or indirect conflict only if,
in addition to good faith, the "transactions are open, fair and honest, and the
corporation is represented by competent and authorized agents."1 3
The severe judicial treatment of director transactions raising loyalty
concerns led many states, including Virginia in 1975,104 to enact a statute
changing the common law voidability rule. Importantly, the original statute
and its successor (current Section 691) have a very narrow scope - abrogating
the common law remedial rule that director self-dealing transactions were
voidable. These statutes in no way nullify or narrow the pervasive common
law duty of loyalty itself, nor do the statutes even address matters, other than
"transactions," that raise loyalty concems. 105 Consequently, as to a transaction
99. This point was reaffirmed in WLR Foods, in which the district court acknowledged
that a "Virginia Corporation's directors and officers owe a duty of loyalty both to the corpora-
tion and to the corporation's stockholders." WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 419,421 (W.D. Va. 1994) (citation omitted), aftd, 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995).
100. Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E.2d 633, 644 (Va. 1940) (emphasis added).
101. See id. at 642 (explaining purpose behind principle forbidding director self-interest
from clashing with duty owed to corporation).
102. See Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp., Inc., 185 S.E.2d 43,46-47 (Va. 1971)
(finding corporate director's self-dealing transactions voidable, even if he acted in good faith
and even if there was no showing of actual injury).
103. Rowland, 6 S.E.2d at 642; see Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725,733 (Va. 1990)
(denying contention that director can deal with his corporation and sell property to it when
defendants failed to establish fairness and honesty of transactions).
104. Act of Mar. 22, 1975, Va. Acts ch. 500, §13.1-39.1 (repealed) (adding Va. Code
§ 13.1-39.1).
105. Section 691's application only to "transactions" means that one ancillary ruling by the
Fourth Circuit in the WLR Foods decision is erroneous. In assessing Tyson's claim that Section
690 should not apply in that ease because of an alleged conflict of interest on the part of the
WLR Foods board of directors, the Fourth Circuit pointed to Section 691 as a provision of
Virginia law "which addresses director conflicts of interest arising from hostile takeover
situations." WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172,1183 (4th Cir. 1995). That
statement by the Fourth Circuit is incorrect because the hostile takeover situation, at least in the
HLR Foods setting, did not involve a "transaction" as is required for application of Section 691.
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within the scope of Section 691, although the transaction itself might not be
voidable solely on conflict of interest grounds, a self-dealing director still
faces personal liability for restitution or damages for breach ofthe underlying,
and still applicable, duty of loyalty. A note to section 8.61 of the Model Act
makes abundantly clear the legislative intent that modem validating statutes,
such as Section 691, leave to judicial decision the separate issue of director
liability for breaching loyalty:
At common law, articulation ofthe legal principles applicable to direc-
tors' conflicts of interest typically declare the transaction to be void or
(sometimes) voidable. These formulations say little about the liabilities,
if any, of the parties to the transaction. It is clear, however, that in some
special circumstances a court would hold that the interested director must
disgorge the profits he made from the transaction or must respond in
damages for injury suffered by the corporation as a result of the transac-
tion. Such sanctions could arise in contexts where the court leaves the
transaction itself in place as well as in situations where the court rescinds
the transaction. Subchapter F leaves these matters of sanction entirely to
the judgment of the court.1
6
Likewise, the commentary to Section 691 sharply differentiates its validating
function from the separate issue of director liability for breach of duty and
expressly leaves to common law the latter issue:
The statute does not directly address the question of a director's liability
to the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty. An example is a transac-
tion that was in fact unfair, because it conferred an excessive benefit on the
officer or director, but was fully performed by the time the issue was
raised. The corporation's right to recover the excess benefit would not be
governed by this section, but by common law of fiduciary duties. °7
As to self-dealing transactions falling outside the coverage of Section
691,108 prior to Willard ex reL Moneta Building Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Build-
A useful discussion of the term "transaction" is found in the Introductory Comment to
Subehapter F of the Model Business Corporation Act § 860 (discussing term "transaction"), and
in Official Comment No. 2 following section 8.60 ofthe Act, id. § 8.60 cmt. 2 (discussing term
"transaction"). Briefly, a "transaction" is said generally to connote "negotiations or a consensual
bilateral arrangement between the corporation and another party or parties that concern their
respective and differing economic rights or interests - not simply a unilateral action by the
corporation but rather a 'deal."' Id. at 8-373.
106. Id. § 8.61, at 8-403 (emphasis added).
107. Report of the Virginia Code Commission, supra note 36, at 250-51.
108. An example of a transaction the Virginia Supreme Court might regard as falling
outside Section 691 is a transaction in which a close family member of the director, rather than
the director himself, had a material interest adverse to the corporation. See Willard ex rel.
Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 286-87 (Va. 1999)
(finding challenged transaction fair and declining to address whether conflict of interest existed
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ing Supply, Inc., it appeared to be an open question whether Virginia courts
would adhere to the older principle ofvoidability. By not addressing the issue
of whether an adult child's adverse financial interests created a director
conflict of interest transaction for purposes of Section 691 - because the court
found the challenged transaction to be "fair"'"° - Willard impliedly rejected
the common law voidability rule even as to transactions outside Section 691.
An alternative reading of Willard is that the voidability rule still applies unless
the transaction is proven "fair," although it is unclear in this context whether
disinterested director or disinterested shareholder approval of the transaction
negates the necessity of proving fairness. In either event, directors still face
personal liability for conflict transactions not covered by Section 691, just as
they do for transactions falling within the scope of that section. Moreover,
loyalty breaches both within and those outside Section 691 should be con-
strued as "willful misconduct" for purposes of avoiding the exoneration
provision set forth in Section 692.1,11 which applies only to "damages" and
should not foreclose pursuit of a restitutionary remedy.
In addition to strictly constraining a director's ability to self-deal with his
corporation, the common-law duty of loyalty broadly prohibits directors from
wrongly usurping corporate opportunities and from engaging in unfair compe-
tition with corporations on whose board of directors they sit."' In all of these
loyalty areas Virginia has relatively little decisional law, but its adherence to
strict standards has been uncompromising." 2 Furthermore, Virginia's articu-
lation of the high standards that directors must meet to transact business with
their own corporation - "open, fair and honest, and the corporation is repre-
sented [competently]""1 3 - and its oft-forgotten requirement that directors owe
"the duty of frankness and fair dealing" in self-dealing matters,"' come very
because corporation director's son owned corporation that purchased assets of director's
corporation).
109. See id. (finding challenged transaction fair and declining to address whether conflict
of interest existed because corporation director's son owned corporation that purchased assets
of director's corporation).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Mlchie 1999) (limiting damages that can be assessed
against director provided that director has not engaged in willful misconduct or violation of
criminal law or state and federal securities law).
111. See PRINcILES, supra note 80, at 1254-56 (noting that duty of loyalty requires direc-
tor to disclose all information regarding personal interest to board members and to make corpo-
rate opportunities available to his corporation before pursuing those opportunities himself).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14, 121-28.
113. Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E.2d 633, 642 (Va. 1940) (describing circumstances under
which director may deal with his corporation or sell his property to his corporation).
114. See Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 133 S.E. 576, 580 (Va. 1926) (finding principal
officers failed in their duty as fiduciaries when they secretly purchased stock in their corporation
following execution of contract to sell majority of their corporation's stock to another company).
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close to the modem Delaware requirements of "fair dealing" and "fair price,"
which together comprise the twin components of an "entire fairness"
inquiry." 5 Virginia courts could readily adopt this exacting "entire fairness"
standard, as well as more developed judicial standards for analyzing wrongful
appropriation of corporate opportunities and unfair competition, as more
elaborate expressions of Virginia's existing common law on these director
loyalty subjects. From whatever sources Virginia courts derive sound policy
and doctrine in the loyalty area, the overarching point here is that director
loyalty in Virginia largely remains a common law and equity subject. Section
690 does not address the duty of loyalty at all, and Section 691 treats only one
dimension of that bedrock duty.
Failing to appreciate this, recently the Virginia Supreme Court analyzed
wrongly, and thereby potentially weakened, this core fiduciary duty. In Wil-
lard, a twenty-percent shareholder in a close corporation challenged the
decision of the two elderly controlling shareholders, who were also the only
directors, to sell substantially all of the corporate assets to a newly-formed
corporation entirely owned by their adult son, himself a five-percent share-
holder in the first corporation and also its newly-resigned president and direc-
tor.1 6 The directors made no efforts to solicit other bids and did not enter into
serious price negotiations with their son." 7 The directors sold the corpora-
tion's assets for $1.3 million, a figure that two business valuation experts
opined to be fair. 8 Critically, however, both experts made their valuations
prior to the date on which the twenty-percent minority shareholder made an
unconditional offer to purchase the assets at a price - $1.9 million - forty-six
percent higher than the son's offer." 9 Moreover, the twenty-percent share-
holder made a "request" (not phrased as a condition) in his rival offer for an
additional thirty days to "fully evaluate the assets and determine whether a
higher value is appropriate.' 20 The two directors never acted as a board to
115. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,1376 (Del. 1993) (finding burden of showing
entire fairness of transaction fell on defendants but noting that in present case only fair dealing
component applied); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,711 (Del. 1983) (observing that
fairness inquiry requires examination of both components).
116. See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515
S.E.2d 277, 280-83 (Va. 1999) (describing circumstances leading up to and surrounding
challenged action by elderly directors).
117. See id. at 282 (noting directors' refusal to consider minority shareholder's competing
offer to purchase corporation's assets at higher price).
118. See id. at 281-82 (describing valuation reports prepared by Hope Player and Associ-
ates, P.C. and by Dr. Larry A. Lynch).
119. See id. at 287 (referring to letter in which minority shareholder offered $600,000 more
than amount offered by director's son).
120. See id. at 290 (Koontz and Hassell, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Ronald
L. Willard, to Amerigo S. and Rose Mary Cappellari (Dec. 19, 1996) (discussing directors'
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consider or act on the rival bid, and the father-shareholder never disclosed or
transmitted it to the mother-shareholder, who had given her husband a proxy
to vote her stock at a shareholder meeting called to act on the proposed sale to
their son. Instead, ignoring the rival bid the directors acted in their capacity
as shareholders to approve the sale to their son that they had earlier authorized
as directors."'
The twenty-percent shareholder launched several attacks on the transac-
tion, including a claim that the two parents had breached their duty of loyalty
to the corporation and to him, both in their capacity as directors and as con-
trolling shareholders.122 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's judgment for defendants." Although the trial court quite remarkably
found the sale of corporate assets to their son to involve no conflict of interest
on the part of the parents under Section 691, the Supreme Court of Virginia
refrained from addressing that issue on the ground that, even if there were
such a conflict, the asset sale was "fair" and thus not voidable under Section
69 124 Setting aside discussion of the court's startling fairness analysis for
a moment, the court's faulty grounding of director loyalty in Section 690
warrants emphasis first.
Upon concluding that the asset sale to the directors' son was not voidable
under Section 691 because it was found to be "fair," the court next addressed
the plaintiff's proper contention that the Section 691 voidability issue was
distinct from his alternative claim for damages for the two directors' breach
of common law loyalty.1" The court concluded that, although it generally
refusal to consider minority shareholder's competing offer to purchase corporation's assets at
higher price)).
121. See id. at 282 (noting that father-shareholder, in person, and mother-shareholder, by
proxy, voted to accept son's offer and refused to discuss minority shareholder's competing offer
at stockholder's special meeting on December 20, 1996).
122. See id. at 282-83 (explaining that minority shareholder brought suit alleging violation
of§ 13.1-691, breach of fiduciary duties, violation of§ 18.2-499, and common law conspiracy).
The author served as a consultant to legal counsel representing the minority shareholder, Ronald
Willard, and thus is familiar with claims brought in this action.
123. See id. at 289 (finding directors discharged their duties in good faith and in best inter-
ests of corporation and finding transaction fair to corporation).
124. Id. at 286-87. For a realistic assessment of how immediate family members should
be treated as "a single controlling group," see Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505, 519-20 (Mass. 1975) (observing that "it is realistic to assume that appreciation, gratitude,
and filial devotion" may create community of interests within family), see also Chaffin v. GNI
Group, Inc., No. Civ. A. 16211-NC, 1999 WL 721569, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that
merger with company in which director's son is economically interested involves director
conflict of interest).
125. See Willard exrel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. MonetaBldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d
227,287 (Va. 1999) (noting minority shareholder's assertion that finding transaction not voidable
under Section 13.1-691 does not resolve issue of director liability for breach of duty of loyalty).
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agreed with plaintiff's proposition,126 a finding of fairness under Section 691
"necessarily" meant defendants had "discharged their duty of loyalty in
compliance with Code Section 13.1-690."'127 Although not made explicit, the
court appeared to base this statement on an assertion made earlier in the
opinion that the fairness standard under Section 691 is "more exacting" than
that under Section 690.28
The court's statement about director loyalty having been discharged in
compliance with Section 690 is a non sequitur. As argued above, Section 690
does not codify the duty of loyalty. Moreover, its standard - "good faith
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation!"' -- is not and
never has been the common law standard for loyalty in Virginia or anywhere
else. The Supreme Court of Virginia itself has pointedly held, in the loyalty
context, that good faith alone, 3' or even coupled with price adequacy,' is not
sufficient to sustain a self-dealing transaction. Moreover, Section 690 logi-
cally cannot be the standard for loyalty because that section places the burden
of proof on the complaining party, 3 2 whereas Virginia decisional law clearly
places the burden of proof on the director in a loyalty claim.'33 Rather, the
proper test for a loyalty claim is the strict traditional test of complete fairness,
with the directors bearing the burden of proof. This means, at a minimum,
that the transaction "as a whole" must be "open, fhir and honest at the time it
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. (discussing standards to use in determining fairness of directors' sale of
corporation assets to son).
129. VA. CoDEANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Michie 1999) (establishing general standard bywhich
director shall erform his duties as director).
130. See Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp., Inc., 185 S.E.2d 43,46-47 (Va. 1971)
(finding director's failure to consult all directors interested in buying more stock before selling
unclaimed shares of corporation stock to himself constituted breach of his duty to corporation
even if director acted in good faith); Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E.2d 633, 643-44 (Va. 1940)
(explaining that, in absence of full disclosure to interested parties, good faith alone on part of
directors will not excuse departure from requirement that directors cannot act inconsistently
with interest of beneficiary they represent).
131. See Kessler, 185 S.E.2d at 47 (finding director's acquisition of 3,275 shares of
corporation stock voidable despite adequacy of price because directors failed to consult all
directors interested in buying more stock before selling unclaimed shares of corporation to
himself).
132. VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-690(D).
133. See, e.g., Izadpanah v. Boeing Joint Venture, 412 S.E.2d 708,709 (Va. 1992) (stating
that "when a conflict of interest as defined in §13.1-691 exists ... the burden shifts to directors
to show that their actions complied with requirements of that section"); Giannotti v. Hamway,
387 S.E.2d 725, 731 (Va. 1990) (noting burden of proof is on directors to show transaction was
fair and acknowledging this rule as exception to business judgment rule which presumes
directors acted properly and in good faith when exercising their business judgment).
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was consummated." '134 Furthermore, Virginia directors who self-deal must
comply with their additional "duty of frankness and fair dealing."
135
Virginia's insistence on the process values of openness, honesty, frank-
ness, and fair dealing, assessed in the transaction as a whole, reveals its
appreciation that the element of "fairness" is not limited to the matter of price
but is multi-faceted. Fairness demands, first, that the particular transaction,
even if entered on economically fair terms, must be affirmatively shown by
the directors to be in the corporation's best interest, not the directors' interest
or that of their child. 36 Second, the Delaware Supreme Court has elaborated
further on the notion of fairness in self-dealing transactions by stating that it
has two aspects:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.
The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial consider-
ations of the proposed [transaction], including all relevant factors: assets,
marketvalue, earnings, futureprospects, and any other elements that affect
the intrinsic or inherentvalue of a company's stock. However, the test for
fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All
aspects of the issue mustbe exanined as a whole since the question is one
of entire fairness. 13
The exacting entire fairness standard requires the interested directors in
a self-dealing transaction to establish '"to the court's satisfaction thatthe trans-
action was the product of both fair dealing and fair price." 3 ' The duty to deal
fairly requires the fiduciary, among other matters, "not to time or structure the
transaction, or to manipulate the corporation's value, so as to permit or facil-
itate the forced elimination of the minority stockholders at an unfair price.'
39
134. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 180 S.E. 164, 169 (Va. 1935); see Rowland, 6
S.E.2d at 642 (noting that director may deal with his corporation if transactions are open, fair,
and honest).
135. Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 133 S.E. 576, 580 (Va. 1926).
136. See Cookies Food Prods. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa
1988) (citing Fill Bldgs. Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co., 241 N.W.2d 466,469 (Mich.
1976) (agreeing with contention that corporate profitability should not be sole criterion to test
fairness and reasonableness of transaction); Fill Bldgs., Inc., 241 N.W.2d at 469 (defining
fairness as requirement that director self-dealing be fair to and in interest of corporation); see
also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.60, at 8-419 to 20 (discussing fair transactions).
137. Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A-2d 701,711 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
138. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (emphasis
added).
139. Sealy Mattress Co., Inc. v. Scaly, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1987); see
Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., No. 12549,1999 WL 39549, at *16-*18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 20,
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"The 'fair price' aspect of an entire fairness analysis requires the board of
directors to demonstrate 'that the price offered was the highest value rea-
sonably available under the circumstances.""
40
Virginia law should be interpreted similarly to require "entire fairness,"
given that it already requires that a transaction be examined "as a whole, [and
be] open, fair, and honest. '141 Virginia law also expressly requires "frank-
ness" and "fair dealing" in director conflict transactions, not simply economic
fairness." 2 In Rowland v. Kable 43 the Virginia Supreme Court underscored
the importance of fair process - not simply fair price - to the court's scrutiny
of transactions raising director loyalty concerns. The court, accordingly,
stated that "good faith" on the part of an interested director in a self-dealing
transaction is not sufficient; rather, there must also be "full disclosure and
consent of the interested parties, to make an exception to the general rule that
a trustee or director cannot enter into any relation or do any act inconsistent
with the interest of the beneficiary he represents." '144 Moreover, the corpora-
tion must be "represented by competent and authorized agents,"'45 who,
needless to say, should be persons other than the parents of a potential buyer
of corporate assets. Additionally, notwithstanding the Willard court's terse
reference to "the earmarks of an arms-length bargain'"46 as an indication of
1999) (finding controlling stockholders gained benefit of manipulated asset values, causing
minority shareholders to suffer damages).
140. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
361 (Del. 1993)). Note that in Delaware when a self-dealing transaction involves the sale of a
company, the "fair price" aspect of the entire fairness analysis requires the board of directors
to demonstrate, in effect, that they also complied with the Revlon standard of "highest value
reasonably available." See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. This confluence of the "fairness" test
and the Revlon standard makes sense when the director's self-dealing transaction under review
involves the end-stage sale of a corporation. In that context, to fulfill their burden of proving
price "fairness," directors should be required to prove that they obtained the "highest value
reasonably available under the circumstances." In this way, whether Virginia has more
generally adopted or rejected Revlon in the break-up or sale context, see infra Part 10.C, at least
in the more limited context of a break-up or sale involving director self-interest, the Revlon
standard and the "fair price" standard sensibly dovetail.
141. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 180 S.E. 164, 169 (Va. 1935) (emphasis added)
(finding fact that president made profit was insufficient reason to rescind contract when presi-
dent acted in good faith and transaction was fair and honest).
142. See Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 133 S.E. 576, 580 (Va. 1926) (stating that
officers of corporation owe duty of frankness and fair dealings as fiduciaries to stockholders and
cannot use position for personal profit).
143. 6 S.E.2d 633 (Va. 1940).
144. Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E.2d 633, 643-44 (Va. 1940); see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 306 (1939) (stating that self-dealing director must show fairness in addition to good faith).
145. Rowland, 6 S.E.2d at 642.
146. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply Inc., 515 S.E.2d
277,287 (Va. 1999) (quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07).
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fairness - hardly evidenced in Willard as there was no indication of "bargain-
ing" at all - the very case cited by Rowland just prior to that phrase had
squarely rejected as insufficient a defense that a challenged self-dealing
transaction was at "arms-length," based on the presence of other shareholder-
harming factors.
147
Commentary to the Model Act supports Virginia and Delaware case law
that insists on fair process and economic fairness in the overall judicial
inquiry into "fairness." The Model Act addresses the importance of fair
"process" (or "fair dealing") in this area of corporate law, indicating that its
absence, even if a deal is economically fair, is grounds for rescission:
Process ofDecision. In some circumstances, the behavior of the director
having the conflicting interest can itself affect the finding and content of
"fairness." The most obvious illustration ofunfair dealing arises out ofthe
director's failure to disclose fully his interest or hidden defects known to
himregardingthetransaction. Another illustration couldbe the exertion of
improperpressurebythe directorupon the other directors. Whenthe facts
ofsuchunfairdealingbecomeknown, the court should offerthe corporation
its option as to whetherto rescindthe transaction on grounds of"unfairness"
even if it appears that the terms were "fair" by market standards and the
corporation profited from it If the corporation decides not to rescind the
transactionbecause ofbusiness advantages accruingto the corporationfrom
it, the court may still find in the director's misconduct a basis forjudicially
imposed sanction against the director personally. Thus, the course of
dealing - or process - is a key component to a "fairness" determination.11
The policy rationale for the common law's strict treatment of loyalty
claims, as seen in the burden of proof shift and in the close judicial scrutiny
of the procedural and substantive components of a transaction's entire fair-
ness, is easy to understand. Where director self-interest is present and affects
a majority of the directors approving a transaction, the focus of concern
pointedly becomes not merely director competence - a concern sufficiently
addressed by the duty of care - but the baseline issue of director loyalty.
Troubled about the foundational issue of director fidelity to the corporation's
interests,'49 judges carefully scrutinize for themselves whether a transaction
is entirely fair to the corporation and its stockholders.15 ° Courts abandon the
147. See Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779-81 (Va. 1975) (finding violation
of fiduciary duty and rejecting defense that transaction was at arms-length when plaintiff
presented evidence of secrecy surrounding transaction, of directors' motivation to retain control,
and of issuance of stock to directors at below value).
148. See MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. § 8.61 cmt. 2, at 8-420 (discussing fair transac-
tions).
149. See Rowland, 6 S.E.2d at 642 (discussing unbending rule of directors' duty to act in
utmost good faith and fairly in dealings with his corporation).
150. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A-2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)
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deference ofthe lax business judgment standard and adopt a far more invasive
test in the loyalty area. As there is no independent decision-maker within the
corporation to oversee its business and affairs, the court necessarily becomes,
on behalf of the shareholders, the only "neutral decision-making body" avail-
able to pass critical judgment on the matter."'
In Willard, the court discarded this settled area of the law. It did so by
grounding the weighty demand of loyalty in the thin soil of Section 690.152
Though the defendants in that particular case supposedly had proven the
"fairness" of the sale, such a showing is really unnecessary if, as the court
held, the applicable loyalty standard is now found in Section 690, where only
a modest "good faith" showing is required. Legal counsel advising a board of
directors on a future self-dealing transaction might read Willard as holding
that even interested directors need only comply with Section 690. In effect,
then, Willard makes the fairness standard of Section 691 a dead letter. Why
bother to prove the "fairness" of a transaction if Section 690 now supplies the
governing standard and that standard is so easily met? The answer, of course,
is that for an interested director the "good faith" of Section 690 is conclusively
nonexistent and that statute simply does not govern the conduct of the inter-
ested director. Rather, Section 691, to the extent applicable, and the pervasive
common law duty of loyalty - both with demanding "fairness" standards -
continue to regulate the behavior of the conflicted director.
The Willard court, anchoring loyalty in the frail language of Section 690,
blithely abandoned its own longstanding equitable principles and endorsed a
deferential rather than strict review of director behavior.1 53 Furthermore, the
court did not honor its earlier decisions that good faith, even if coupled with
price adequacy, is insufficient to sustain conflict transactions. The court also
wrongly failed to insist that "fairness" entail the key procedural aspects of
"fair dealing" (including, among other factors, Virginia's longstanding re-
quirements of openness and full disclosure) as well as fair price. On price
fairness grounds alone, it is not demonstrably fair for a board to cavalierly
(stating that "judicial reluctance to assess the merits of a business decision ends in the face of
illicit manipulation of a board's deliberative processes by self-interested corporate fiduciaries").
151. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 Ak2d 1156, 1170 & n.25 (Del. 1995)
(stating that when board of directors' loyalty is in question, Delaware courts have duty to
determine whether conflict has deprived stockholders of "neutral decision-making body"); see
generally Johnson, Business Judgment, supra note 12.
152. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
153. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d
277, 287 (Va. 1999). That the Willard court brought the same intensity (or lack thereof) to its
review of the loyalty issue as to the Section 690 care issue can be seen in its assertion that the
"facts that support the circuit court's conclusion that AS. and Rose Mary exercised their 'good
faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation' equally sustains the court's
judgment on this [fairness] issue and need not be repeated." Id.
1156
MISUNDERSTANDING DIRECTOR DUTIES
ignore a bid forty-six percent higher than the alternative. Nor do expert
valuations made before the date of the rival bid provide support for a finding
of fair price, where fair price means the only sensible thing it can mean in this
setting: the "highest value reasonably available."154
Overall, to honor the sound policy rationales underpinning the duty of
loyalty and to preserve integrity in Virginia corporate law, the Willard court
should have held that an asset sale to the son of the only two directors, con-
ducted solely by directors who were unwilling to consider a rival topping bid,
to disclose it to an absent shareholder, or to seek expert revaluation of an
earlier bid, constitutes unfair dealing and an egregious breach of director
loyalty. The transaction either should have been nullified under Section 691
or the two parent-director/shareholders should have been found personally
liable to the twenty-percent shareholder for twenty percent of the difference
between a "fair price" (minimally, the rival bid) and the actual sales price.
The unremitting rigor of loyalty in Virginia corporate law must be
reclaimed. This begins with an appreciation that Section 690's deferential
standard was designed to encourage risk-taking by directors on behalf of the
enterprise and its shareholders, not to shield director action squarely opposed
to those interests. The innovation of Section 690 in the care area does not
detract from the importance of continued zealous judicial oversight in the
loyalty area. Care and loyalty are distinctive legal virtues. After Willard,
however, minority shareholders in start-up Virginia ventures must bargain
expressly for protections formerly provided by a robust duty of loyalty. This
is inefficient and impedes and raises the cost of capital formation for Virginia
154. See supra text accompanying note 140. A separate but related point about director
reliance on expert valuation opinions should be made here. In Willard, the directors defended
the price of the asset sale to their son on the ground that they had two expert opinions that the
sale price was fair and, under Section 690(B), directors are entitled to rely on opinions of experts.
The fatal flaw in that argument, a flaw the court did not even address, is that the two fairness
opinions preceded the minority shareholder's rival bid. Therefore, the directors lost their ability
under Section 690(B) to rely on the opinions because that subsection conditions director reliance
on a director having no "knowledge or information concerning the matter in question that makes
reliance unwarranted ...." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (Michie 1999); see Commonwealth
Transp. Comm'r v. Mateyiko, 481 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Va. 1997) (finding directors personally
liable when they voted to distribute corporate assets upon dissolution because they had knowl-
edge that condemnation award probably would be less than amount to be distributed under
"drawdown" order, thereby making reliance unwarranted). The directors in Willard, of course,
knew that the two earlier expert opinions were rendered before the appearance of an unqualified
offer to purchase corporate assets at a 46% higher price, and accordingly, the directors possessed
knowledge that made reliance on those earlier expert opinions unwarranted. As former Chancel-
lor William Allen aptly stated and the Delaware Supreme Court quoted: "A decent respect for
reality forces one to admit that... advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute
for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant market can provide." Barkan v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (quoting In re Amsted Indus. Litig., No.
CIVAP8224,1988 WL 92736, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,1988)).
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corporations. Current minority shareholders already in Virginia corporations
cannot now contract for protection that was thought at the time of investment
to have been amply provided by loyalty. They must press for a revisiting of
the issues evaded in Willard, with the hope of restoring that healthy skepti-
cism long brought to judicial monitoring ofthese disturbing transactions. The
full mischief might not end with Virginia companies, however. Having both
a "unique" standard of care and (post-Willard) a unique standard of loyalty,
Virginia may gain an unenviable reputation among out of state companies and
counsel as the preferred haven of re-incorporation when lax review of contem-
plated director self-dealing is sought.
B. Duty of Disclosure
Under Virginia corporate law, after adopting a plan in a merger or asset
sale, directors must submit the proposed transaction to shareholders for
approval.'55 Is there, in conjunction with this submittal, a director duty to
disclose fully all material facts and a duty not to make material misstatements
in such disclosures? What is the source of such duties? Is it Section 690?
In Delaware, directors have a duty to shareholders to disclose accurately
all material information when seeking shareholder action.'56 Recently, direc-
tor duty was extended to cover situations in which shareholder action is not
requested but corporate injury or financial damage to shareholders could
occur as a result of disseminating false information. 7 In both settings,
directors must "provide a balanced, truthful account of all matters disclosed
in the communications with shareholders."'58 The duty includes an obligation
to avoid misleading partial disclosures and to update such prior partial disclo-
sures as may be misleading if not supplemented."5 9
155. See VA.CoDEANN. §§ 13.1-718-724.
156. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (stating that directors have fiduciary
duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within their control when seeking
shareholder action); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1125 (1996) ("[1In
a facet of the opinion much less heralded than its duty of care ruling, Van Gorkom took one
further, significant step to enunciate an independent duty on the part of directors to disclose
material information when submitting a merger proposal to stockholders and to authorize apost
hoc damages remedy against directors who fail to fulfill that duty.") (discussing Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985)).
157. See Malone, 722 A_2d at 12 (stating that fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith apply when directors disseminate information to stockholders, even when no stockholder
action is sought).
158. Id.
159. See Zion v. V.L Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996) (noting that directors have
obligation to provide shareholders with accurate, full, and fair characterization of "historic
events" to which partial disclosure relates); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d
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The source of the director disclosure duty is not statutory;6 it is equita-
ble in nature and "derives from the combination ofthe fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty and good faith."'' Where a board specifically seeks shareholder
approval for a director self-dealing transaction, however, the duty of disclo-
sure "exists as an essential component ofthe duty of loyalty ... ,162 Concern-
ing damages for breach of the duty of disclosure when nondisclosure causes
"impairment to the economic or voting rights of shareholders,"'6 3 Delaware
has adopted a "virtual per se rule of damages."'1 Finally, director conduct in
duty of disclosure cases is not reviewed under the deferential business judg-
ment standard.16' The reason for this is simply that the key rationale for
judicial deference - business judgment - is not present when director compli-
ance with a legal standard (suficiency of disclosure) is at issue.
Virginia courts follow the latter principle of confining deferential review
to director decisions that are business judgments and not, for example, to
director decisions construing or applying statutes or bylaws.'66 The propriety
of a board's construction of applicable legal standards - such as a duty of
disclosure - remains fully subject to judicial review. This result makes sense
on policy grounds because judicial deference is inappropriate when legal rather
thanbusinessjudgments are at issue. The result also makes sense under Section
690 which, as seen above, 67 is a partial expression ofthe director duty of care,
based on the exercise of"business judgment." When business judgment has not
166, 171 (Del. 1991) ("If subsequent events impart a new and significant slant on information
already discussed, their disclosure is mandated.").
160. A possible exception to this statement arises when a director conflict of interest
statute, such as VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Michie 1999), codifies a director duty of disclosure
as a prerequisite to obtaining director or shareholder approval of interested deals involving a
director. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342,368 n.70 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(stating that Delaware code codifies such duty).
161. Malone, 722 A.2d at 11.
162. WaltDisney, 731 A.2d at 369.
163. See Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997) (limiting
In re Tri-StarPictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A-2d 319 (Del. 1993)).
164. Tn -Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 333.
165. See Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, Inc., No. CIV.A.15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *6
n.4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (refusing to rely exclusively on business judgment rule analysis);
In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholder's Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding
directors not entitled to benefit of business judgment presumption because matter did not
concern management of business or affairs of enterprise but rather related to directors' duty to
shareholders).
166. See Lake Monticello Owners' Ass'n v. Lake, 463 S.E.2d 652, 656 (Va. 1995) ("[A]
necessary predicate for the application of the business judgment rule is that the directors'
decision be that of a business judgment and not a decision, such as that in this case, which
construes and applies a statute and a corporate bylaw.") (emphasis added).
167. See supra Part I.
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been exercised or when a director obligation is not wholly rooted in the duty of
care and its underlying policy rationales, Section 690 is not implicated. The
issue of whether Virginia recognizes a particular director duty - here, disclo-
sure - then becomes, as with loyalty, a matter of common law and equity.p
Virginia long ago recognized, in equity, that directors owe a disclosure
duty in the self-dealing context.169 In Upton v. Southern Produce Co.,17°
controlling officer-directors purchased shares of stock from their corporation
and from other shareholders while possessing a third-party offer to buy all
such stock at a higher priceY71 The officer-directors did not disclose to the
corporation or its shareholders the former parties' contractual right to sell the
purchased stock to a third party at a price higher than the price paid to the
selling corporation and shareholders.172 The Virginia Supreme Court stated
that the officer-directors could not "legitimately purchase" the stock "without
disclosure of all the facts to the other directors or stockholders."173 As con-
trolling officers they were said to owe "the duty of frankness and fair dealing
as fiduciaries to all the stockholders .... ,,174
In Willard, the court did not address how the father-director might have
breached this director disclosure duty.17  In that case, the day before the
shareholder meeting called to consider approval of an asset sale to the direc-
tors' son's company, the father-director received from the twenty-percent
minority shareholder a rival bid forty-six percent higher than the proposed sale
price.176 Holding a proxy to vote his wife's stock, the father-director did not
disclose the significantly higher offer to his wife, a substantial shareholder. 7'
Such a competing bid was "material" in that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.7 Specifically, in light of the
168. The exception in Virginia, as in Delaware, see supra note 160, is the disclosure
required of an interested director who seeks the protection of Section 691.
169. See Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 180 S.E. 164, 169 (Va. 1935) (stating that
director may deal with his corporation but he must be open, fair, and honest); Upton v. Southern
Produce Co., 133 S.E. 576, 580 (Va. 1926) (noting that principal officers of company owed
duty of frankness and fair dealing as fiduciaries to stockholders).
170. 133 S.E. 576 (Va. 1926).
171. Id. at577-78.
172. See id. at 578.
173. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
174. Id.; see Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp., Inc., 185 S.E.2d 43, 46-47 (Va.
1971) (requiring director to make full disclosure).
175. See generally Willard ex rel. Monetn Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply Inc.,
515 S.E.2d 277 (Va. 1999).
176. Id. at282.
177. Id.
178. The Delaware Supreme Court has described the materiality standard as follows: "An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
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substantially higher rival bid, the mother-shareholder might have revoked the
proxy or otherwise have altered voting instructions to the proxy holder.1 9
Failing to make the required disclosure, the father-director breached his
equitable duty of disclosure. The non-disclosure impaired shareholder eco-
nomic and voting rights and, therefore, liability should have resulted without
requiring the elements of reliance, causation, or actual quantifiable monetary
damages."'°
Virginia directors who communicate with shareholders - whether or not
in a self-dealing context - should be obligated to make full and accurate
disclosure. The importance of disclosure is recognized in Section 691, which
allows self-dealing transactions to be immunized from common law
voidability if director or shareholder approval is gained after disclosure of all
material facts."' Disclosure in self-dealing transactions already is mandated
under Virginia decisional law, and the director duty of disclosure should be
generalized. Although the federal securities law's proxy rules broadly dictate
disclosure for those Virginia corporations that are reporting companies" and
provide a private remedy for material misstatements or omissions," 3 non-
reporting companies are exempt from federal securities law proxy rules.
Moreover, when a controlling shareholder exists, remedies under federal
proxy rules for disclosure violations may be foreclosed because of the impos-
consider it important in deciding how to vote .... Put another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Zion v.
V.I. Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d
929,944 (Del. 1985)).
179. See Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 286. This possibility must be given credence because the
Virginia Supreme Court cited from the trial court record evidence which "demonstrated that
David's resignation as an officer and director of Moneta and his new business plans had caused
considerable discord between him and his parents." Id. The court cannot both refuse to hold
as a matter of law that a director has a disabling conflict of interest when selling substantially
all the business assets to his or her child and not take seriously a claim that the parent-share-
holder would want to know about an alternative bid offering 46% more money.
180. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) ("An action for a breach of
fiduciary duty arising out of disclosure violations in connection with a request for stockholder
action does not include the elements of reliance, causation and actual quantifiable monetary
damages.").
181. SeeVA. CoDEANN. § 13.1-691 (Michie 1999).
182. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994) (making solicitation
of proxies in violation of broad disclosure requirements unlawful); 17 CFR § 240.14a-1 to 14a-
15 (1999) (describing requirements as to proxy solicitation).
183. See 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1999) (providing that no solicitation shall contain statement
that is false or misleading as to any material fact or that omits any material fact); see also J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (stating that Securities Exchange Act authorizes
private federal cause of action for recission or damages to stockholder with respect to merger
authorized pursuant to proxy statements containing materially false or misleading statements).
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sibility of showing the required causation."8 4 In contrast, no causation element
exists under state disclosure law. Virginia corporations and their directors
should not be exempt from what, on policy grounds, is rightly regarded as a
duty of growing importance in dealings with information-hungry
shareholders,185 the Virginia state law duty of disclosure. This duty springs
not from Section 690, but from equity.
C. Revlon Duty
An important open question, prior to the recent Willard decision, was
whether, notwithstanding Section 690, directors of Virginia corporations had
a so-called "Revlon" duty'1 6 to maximize the sale price in a corporate break-up
or control change transaction. 87 The Willard court held that "the Revlon test
is not applicable in Virginia."'88 Although there may or may not be good
reasons to follow Revlon in Virginia, the Willard court's reasoning on this
issue - that the meager phrasing of Section 690 somehow resolves this com-
plex social policy issue'89 - is shallow and unpersuasive.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.'9° and its progeny that once a board of directors under-
takes a transaction that will "break-up" a corporation or result in a change of
its control, the board's duty radically changes from preserving the corporate
entity "to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockhold-
ers' benefit."'' Put another way, Delaware holds that, in corporate end-stage
184. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) (stating that
causation element cannot be demonstrated by member of class of minority shareholders whose
votes are not required to authorize transaction giving rise to claim).
185. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342,369 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("The
recognized usefulness of information has pushed disclosure into a far more central role ....
The increase in importance of the duty of disclosure has taken place in conjunction with the
expanded role of the duty of care .....
186. See supra note 8.
187. See GooLsBY, supra note 96, § 9.7, at 122.2-.7 (advocating that Virginia should
follow Revlon).
188. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d
277,284 (Va. 1999).
189. See id.
190. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
191. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that duty of board of directors changes from preservation of corporate entity to
maximization of common stock price when sale of company becomes inevitable). Later cases
have extended Revlon, obligating directors to obtain the best value reasonably available to
stockholders
in at least the following three scenarios: (1) "[W]hen a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization
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settings, directors are singularly "charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company.""~ Considerations other than those
centered on shareholder welfare, such as employee well-being, are improper.
Later decisions have elaborated and refined the contours ofthis duty.193 Thus,
the Revlon duty has been reformulated as an "obligation... to seek the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders. 194 Consequently, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has emphasized that the applicable standard is one of
"reasonableness," not perfection.1 9 A board decision to pursue what it
regards as the "best price" will not be disturbed, therefore, if it selects "one of
several reasonable alternatives."'9"
Several points must be understood about this standard and its bearing on
Virginia law. First, the Willard court completely misdescribed the Revlon
duty when it stated that "[s]uch a rule would mean that only one offer, among
many, was inthe best interests ofthe corporation.""9 As seen above, a correct
statement of Delaware law is that a director decision on "best price" need only
be "within a range of reasonableness."1"
Second, WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.'99 is not authority on the
Revlon issue.2" WLR Foods involved aboard of directors' decision not to sell
the company, the board having concluded that continued independence was
involving a clear break-up of the company," ... (2) "[W]here, in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction involving the break-up of the company," ... or (3) "[W]hen approval
of a transaction results in a 'sale or change of control' ....
Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994) (citations omitted)
(discussing corporate directors' duty to seek transaction offering best value reasonably available
to stockholders); see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,43
(Del. 1994) (discussing obligation of corporate directors in sale or change of control transaction).
192. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that corporate directors have duty to maximize
common stock price when sale of company is inevitable).
193. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
194. See Paramount Communications, 637 A.2d at 48 (discussing duty of directors when
corporation undertakes transaction that will cause change in corporate control or break-up of
corporate entity).
195. See id. at 45 (applying reasonableness standard to judicial scrutiny of corporate
directors' actions in sale or change of control of corporation).
196. Id.
197. See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515
S.E.2d 277,285 (Va. 1999) (concluding thatRevlon test is inapplicable in Virginia).
198. See supra text accompanying note 195.
199. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996).
200. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming
trial court's entry of declaratory judgment ruling target corporation's defensive measures against
corporate takeover bidder were valid when target company was not in sale or control change
mode).
56 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1127 (1999)
in both the corporation's and shareholders' best interests."' That decision,
speaking to a situation completely within the coverage of Section 690, is not
authority on the quite different question presented by Revlon and Willard:
once having decided to sell the company, do directors have a singular duty to
attain the "best price" reasonably available for shareholders? Moreover, the
Revlon issue is not answered by the skimpy language of Section 690 because
that section - which necessarily assumes the continued existence of the
"corporation" in its insistence that directors consider the "best interests of the
corporation" - does not even speak to that issue.
Third, as seen earlier, Section 690 specifies the standard of care in those
settings in which directors make business judgments discharging their duties
on behalf of the (presumably ongoing) corporation. 2 Section 690 does not
establish the benchmark for evaluating director conduct when director loyalty
is at issue. Establishment of this benchmark has remained the separate
province of the judge-made duty of loyalty. In the Revlon setting, both
director loyalty and care are implicated.0 3 The loyalty issue, to be sure, is not
like the typical case in which, as in a classic self-dealing transaction, a direc-
tor's own self-interest pointedly conflicts with the joint interests of the corpo-
ration and shareholders. Rather, the loyalty interest in the end-stage setting
concerns which one of two potentially divergent sets of interests deserve the
unswerving loyalty of directors: Shareholder interests only or the wider set
of "corporation" interests, which include those of employees and customers
as well as shareholders. A director can breach this latter duty of loyalty by
failing to be allegiant to the law's intended recipients of director effort, even
though a director's own personal self-interest may not be involved.2" By
analogy, a trustee breaches trust not simply by preferring his own personal
interests, but by preferring the interests of a stranger over those of the trust's
beneficiary. Lack of self-interest alone does not negate a loyalty concern.
The root issue in Revlon is whether director loyalty requires exclusive
focus on shareholder welfare at a corporation's end-stage or permits (or
requires) directors to factor in a broader array of non-shareholder consider-
ations. An understanding of this root issue reveals that Section 690 simply
201. See supra text accompanying notes 25-3 1.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
203. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1994) (discussing duty of directors when corporation undertakes transaction that will cause
change in corporation control or break-up of corporate entity).
204. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A-2d 1261, 1284 n.32 (Del. 1988)
(describing conduct of disinterested directors who abdicated responsibilities as breach of duties
of care and loyalty); see also CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUID BOOK, supra note 80, at 1254-55
("The duty of loyalty requires directors to exercise their powers in the interests of the corpora-
tion and not in the directors' own interest or in the interest of another person (including a
family member) or organization." (emphasis added)).
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does not address that core social policy debate, one that has raged for many
years.2"' Consequently, Willard's reasoning that Revlon does not apply in
Virginia simply because Section 690 deleted the "reasonableness" requirement
of Model Act section 8.30 is wholly beside the point.2"s The element of
"reasonableness" in a standard of care statute does not settle the Revlon issue
because "reasonableness" in such a statute is not an element pertaining to the
substantive business decision, but goes only to the manner of director con-
duct.207 The duty of care's limited judicial function is to guide a court's
inquiry into only theprocess by which directors act. Consequently, a straight-
forward statutory standard of director conduct, whether a Section 690 good
faith or section 8.30 reasonableness standard, simply does not speak to the
contentious substantive issue of who should be the intended beneficiary of
director loyalty upon the imminent demise of a corporate venture.
Respectable policy arguments can be made on both sides of the Revlon
issue. Willard short-circuited the possibility of genuine debate on that critical
issue by wrongly holding that Section 690 somehow had settled the point.
Factually that was error in Willard, given the trial court record that the direc-
tors pointedly had approved the asset sale because they thought it was in the
best interests of shareholders."8 More problematical, in Virginia, where
directors have no statutory duties to attend affirmatively to the interests of
non-shareholders,2" Willard now relieves directors of a duty to attend vigor-
ously to the interests of shareholders as well. In other words, in the break-up
or sale context, Virginia directors apparently have no legal duty to advance
the interests of shareholders or anyone else. They need not conduct an
auction, engage in price-testing market checks, or take any other measures -
including exertion of any effort to negotiate vigorously with a buyer-son or
consider a substantially higher rival bid - designed to achieve the goal of
gaining the "best price." Indeed, after Willard, directors will be hard-pressed
to withstand an acquirer's insistence on including a "no-shop" or "no-talk" pro-
vision in any merger or asset sale agreement. The acquirer will also strongly
205. See generally Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are
TheyFor?, 43 WASIL & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986) (analyzing interests served by corporations and
their managements in context of corporate takeovers).
206. See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515
S.E.2d 277,285 (Va. 1999) (concluding Revlon test inapplicable in Virginia).
207. See MoDELBus. CoRP. AcrANN. § 8.30, at 8-168 (3d ed. 1996).
208. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc., No.
981836, letter op. at 12 (Va. 24th Jud. Cir. May 14, 1998).
209. Over half the states have enacted statutes that expressly allow corporate boards of
directors to consider the interests of various non-shareholder constituencies in making board
decisions. For a description and analysis of these statutes, see generally David Millon, Redefin-
ing Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 (1991) (re-examining role of business corporation in
society following recent wave of statutes expressly redefining corporate management's duty).
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resist inclusion of the customary "fiduciary out" clause from such a no-shop
or no-talk provision to enable the selling corporation to fulfill its duty to
pursue a superior bid. After Willard, Virginia no longer recognizes a director
duty to pursue a "superior" bid. Therefore directors cannot seek, on legal duty
grounds, such a "fiduciary out." Thus investors in Virginia corporations lose,
with no socially desirable countervailing winner, such as employees, custom-
ers, or local communities. Only family members or favored buyers standing
on the other side of low-ball sales will gain from this ruling.
1V The Faulty Architecture of Section 690
Section 690 is not, as seen above, the sole source of legal standard for
director conduct in Virginia. It is not even a broadly applicable standard of
care. Rather, for all its vaunted uniqueness, it applies more narrowly than any
other state's statutory standard. Its scope is limited to those instances in
which directors exercise business judgment. This diminished coverage of
Section 690 resulted from Virginia's misguided decision to use in a statute
purporting to articulate "general standards of conduct" certain language -
"good faith business judgment" - that historically does not express a broadly
applicable director duty of care. Rather the phrase "business judgment"
reflects a powerful but narrowly gauged policy preference disfavoring judicial
review of substantive business judgments.
Bluntly stated, the duty of care and the business judgment rule are two
distinct legal concepts.21 The duty of care governs directors. The business
judgment rule is a policy ofjudicial review. The duty of care unremittingly
requires that, at all times in all settings,21' corporate directors behave in a par-
ticular manner. As most frequently formulated, the standard is that a director
must act with the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under
similar circumstances." Whether or not the director is making a business
judgment, the director's duty demands that the director act with a specified
degree of care. Such care includes becoming reasonably informed about and
paying deliberate attention to all facets of directing the management of the
corporation's business and affairs. Absent statutory exoneration, 213 if the
director does not act with care, whether from nonfeasance or malfeasance, the
director is liable for all damages proximately caused by the director's breach
210. See generally Johnson, Business Judgment, supra note 12 (examining relationship
between director duty of care and business judgment rule).
211. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("Fiduciary duty does not operate
intermittently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the corporation and
interactions with its shareholders must be guided.").
212. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 65-68 (discussing director duty of reasonable
care in performance of director duties).
213. See VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1999) (permitting reduction or elimination
of officer or director personal liability).
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of duty. In such a breach of duty context, there is no need to judicially review
the merits of the business decision.
If a director does act with care, he is not liable for any damage resulting
from the careful conduct. Although much misunderstood, it is only here that
the real substantive thrust of the business judgment rule comes into play. The
business judgment rule - a judge-made rule - is a policy of judicial review
whereby courts will not assess the substantive soundness or unsoundness of
a board's business judgments for the purpose of evaluating director care. The
rule, moreover, has no application unless a "business judgment" has been
made.214 Thus, director conduct not involving the exercise of business judg-
ment - such as an unconsidered failure to monitor corporate affairs - is
reviewed for compliance with the always-applicable duty of care but receives
no protective shelter under the business judgment rule.
The protection of the rule is grounded on various well-known and
widely-agreed upon policy rationales.21 Most importantly, the rule provides
that for the purpose of determining whether directors have acted in accordance
with the applicable standard of care, the resulting substantive business deci-
sion will not be judicially reviewed as part of the care inquiry. Consequently,
whether or not directors comply with the applicable standard of care, the
merits of the business decision will not factor into judicial assessment of
director conduct.
The relationship between the pervasive, always-applicable director duty
of care and the judicially-created policy of non-review of business judgments
housed in the business judgment rule is one of the most important, but least
understood, relationships in corporate law. It is not the burden of this Article
to disentangle these two central corporate law concepts.216 The aim, rather,
is to elucidate the mischief created by Virginia's conflating of these two
related but distinctive notions. What Virginia uniquely and confusingly has
done is to implant the highly-specialized terminology of the strictly demar-
cated business judgment concept into a duty of care statute captioned "General
standards of conduct for director."
217
Seeking to disavow the "prudent" and "reasonable" language of the
Model Business Corporation Act and other statutory codifications of care,21
the drafters of Section 690 wrongly thought those adjectives allow reviewing
214. See supra notes 41,166 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that director's
decision must be in nature of business judgment for business judgment rule to be applicable).
215. See generally Johnson, Rethinking JudicialReview, supra note 12 (articulating policy
rationale for director duty of care).
216. See generally Johnson, Business Judgment, supra note 12 (examining relationship
between director duty of care and business judgment rule).
217. VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-690.
218. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Model Business Corporation
Act promulgation of director duty of care standard).
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courts to assess the substance of director decisions. The recent Willard
opinion neatly illustrates this confusion. Contrasting Section 690 with Model
Act section 8.30, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded "that, in Virginia,
a director's discharge of duties is not measured by what a reasonable person
would do in similar circumstances or by the rationality of the ultimate deci-
sion. 219 What the court did not appreciate is that under no standard of care,
whether found in statute or case law, should a court assess director care by
looking at the "reasonableness" or "rationality" of the ultimate business
decision. The reason for this is the preclusive operation of the business
judgment rule. Virginia's deletion of "prudence" and "reasonableness" from
Section 690 was therefore not necessary to achieve a result already attained
by a separate legal doctrine.
What the elements of "prudence" and "reasonableness" add, whether at
common law or in statutory codifications of care, are only process-oriented
standards of how a director is to behave - i.e., the manner in which a director
is to act.220 Those elements do not introduce into judicial evaluation of
director compliance with the duty of care a warrant to assess the substantive
correctness of director business decisions. To do so - or to interpret Model
Act-type statutes as doing so- would be to upend decades of settled law. The
duty of care more modestly prescribes only a certain manner of conduct,
leaving to the separate legal concept of the business judgment rule the job of
preventing courts from reviewing the substantive merits of director decisions.
Inasmuch as Virginia common law recognized the business judgment rule
prior to the enactment of Section 690,"1 that section assuredly did not intro-
duce into Virginia law the concept that substantive business decisions should
not be judicially reviewed. If the policy thrust of the pre-existing business
judgment rule was not statutorily modified, then Section 690 only altered the
duty of care. If anything, without WLR Foods insistence on an informed
decision-making process,2" Section 690's singular element of "good faith"
would have loosened Virginia's business judgment notion. Virginia, unlike
other states, does not require that director care (as distinguished from a
business decision itself) be measured by standards of prudence or reasonable-
ness. Rather, Section 690 measures director care (as distinguished from a
business decision itself) by a "good faith business judgment" standard.
Section 690 thus collapses two historically distinct legal concepts so that the
219. See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515
S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) (concluding that director must act in accordance with director's
good faith business judgment of what is in best interest of corporation).
220. See supra text accompanying note 11.
221. See, e.g., Giannotti v. Hamway,387 SYE.2d 725, 731 (Va. 1990) (collecting authority).




duty of care is synonymously formulated in terms of a director's good faith
business judgment.
This means, first, that the scope of Virginia's statutory standard of
director conduct is narrower than that in any other state. It is limited, like the
business judgment rule itself from which its wording is derived, to those
instances in which director judgment is exercised. In other instances in which
judgment is not exercised, the common law duty of care, with its requirements
of prudence and reasonableness, still governs, however ironic this outcome
might be. Any other reading of Section 690, such as that it sets the standard
whether or not judgment is exercised, requires reference to some unspecified
standard to evaluate the propriety of director conduct in those settings in
which judgment was not exercised but a shareholder claims judgment should
have been exercised. Not referring in that situation to some standard outside
Section 690 to resolve whether director non-exercise of judgment was proper
is to convert Section 690 into a strict liability statute. A more sensible con-
struction is that Section 690 cannot provide the benchmark for evaluating the
propriety of director conduct not involving the exercise of judgment because
Section 690 measures director conduct in terms of the exercise ofjudgment.
Second, given that the director duty of care and the business judgment rule
are two distinct concepts in corporate law, it is, at the least, peculiar to express
a statutory standard of care that - for reasons presumably grounded in the
General Assembly's view of good public policy and morality - directors are
legally mandated to fulfill in terms of what the director himself judges to be
best. The self-referential standard of Section 690 requires the director to
exercise only that degree of care (ifthat word can still be meaningfiflly used in
this context) which the director judges to be inthe best interests of the corpora-
tion. As long as the director makes a good faith judgment, that judgment itself
is the standard of care, and so the standard necessarily is fulfilled. Inept direc-
tors should be called to account for their incompetence; however, they should
not be allowed to lower the bar of legal duty to their own poor performance.
Director care need not be compromised in this fashion simply to preserve
director discretion. The venerable business judgment rule provides significant
judicial deference when deference is sound on policy grounds. Separately, the
duty of care requires that directors behave in a particular manner. As long as
they do, their decisions will be honored, and they will incur no liability.
Virginia, in Section 690, sought to eviscerate with little fanfare a critical
director duty - the duty to act with the reasonable care of an ordinarily
prudent director. Moreover, many believe that Section 690 sweeps so broadly
that a completely unrelated duty - the duty of loyalty - also became lodged in
Section 690.2' This even more bizarre reading makes the director's judgment
223. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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his own measure of loyalty, as well as of care. In this solipsistic view, loyalty
becomes radically individualized, meaning whatever a self-referential director
says it means. Gone is any sense that loyalty is a meaningful notion only
when it reflects and demands adherence to widely shared community values
reminding us of our obligation to others. 4 When the very language of loyalty
no longer exhorts a fiduciary to transcend the personal, it loses all power to
inspire and challenge, much less to sanction. When this happens, the person
endowed with responsibility is inclined to slacken in devotion while the
person in dependence tends toward disenchantment or self-help, each of which
is socially costly.
The upshot of these faulty views on the role of Section 690 in Virginia's
law of director duties is that many believe that the section wholly encompasses
and defines director duties. This Article argues against this widespread but
dangerous misunderstanding of director duties. The misreading of Section 690
must be resisted on many fronts, including in that considerable aspect of
director care not involving business judgment, in the still applicable common
law duty of loyalty, and in the emergent duty of disclosure. As to Section 690
itself, it should be hailed for what it does do and disregarded for what it does
not do. Ifmembers ofthe bar conclude that confining Section 690 to its proper
quarters is too difficult at this date, then it should be amended to require
simply that directors act with the care reasonably expected from an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances.2" The business
judgment rule will advance the goal of director protection from there. If the
scope of Section 690 is not interpreted narrowly as is argued for here or if it is
not amended, then the only remaining doubt hanging over that section is this:
Will a court of equity engraft onto the pallid legal requirements of Section 690
the further equitable obligation that directors act with genuine care, as that
term has been more richly understood over the past countless years?
Conclusion - Recapitulating Director Duties
Director duties in Virginia can be summarized as follows: Directors
continue to owe a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to their corporations. If
a business judgment is made specifically not to sell control (i.e., the W-LR
Foods case), then the only applicable standard of conduct is Section 690,
without regard to whether director care or loyalty is involved. This is not
because Section 690 codifies loyalty. It is because several statutory sections
224. For a wonderful sampling of stories portraying how loyalty connects us to our fellow
humans, see WILLIAM J. BENNETr, TBE BooK oF VIRTuEs 663-737 (1993).
225. This formulation has the virtue of simplicity and is very close to the common law




combine to make clear that Section 690 applies exclusively in that narrow
context,2 6 thus making the care or loyalty inquiry irrelevant. If a business
judgment is made in a setting other than a decision not to sell control, the
applicable standard of care is that set forth in Section 690, provided no con-
flict of interest or other loyalty-implicating factor is involved. If no director
business judgment is made - as might happen in, for example, the oversight
and monitoring area - the applicable standard of care is the common law duty
of reasonable care, again provided no conflict of interest or other loyalty-
implicating factor is involved.
Outside the narrow setting of a board decision not to sell control - in
which Section 690 alone governs - the director duty of loyalty demands that
when conflict of interest or unfair competition is involved, the standard of
director conduct and of judicial review of such conduct should be entire, or
whole, fairness. The burden of proof on the entire fairness issue is on the
director(s) with the divided loyalty, and courts should scrutinize closely those
matters. Fairness should entail a threshold determination that a matter was
affirmatively in the corporation's best interests. Thereafter, fairness includes
both the process element of "fair dealing" and the economically substantive
element of "fair price." As to conflict of interest transactions falling within
the ambit of Section 691, that statute serves only to modify Virginia's com-
mon law rule of transactional voidability. Moreover, the term "fair" in that
statute should be construed to mean "entire fairness" as that concept was
described above. Section 691 leaves to the common law of loyalty - not
Section 690 - the issue of personal liability for damages (or other remedial
relief) owed by the conflicted director(s) engaged in the transaction. Here too,
the standard of conduct and review on the damages and remedies issue should
be "entire fairness" as that concept was described above. As to conflict of
interest transactions falling outside the scope of Section 691, the common law
standard for both transactional validity and personal liability for damages (and
other remedial relief) should be "entire fairness" as that concept was described
above. Section 691 should be amended by the General Assembly to provide
more inclusively for transactional certainty across a broader range of director
conflict transactions. Sections 8.60 through 8.63 of the Model Business
Corporation Act offer a possible statutory model.227
If a business judgment is made specifically to break-up a corporation or
to sell control of the corporation, the good faith business judgment standard
226. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996) (discussing how VA. CODEANN. § § 13.1-646B, 727.1, and 728.9
refer to Section 690 as applicable to declaratory and injunctive action between target corpora-
tion and takeover bidder).
227. See MoDELBus. CoRP.AcTANN. §§ 8.60-.63 (3d ed. 1996) (codifying statutory rules
applicable when director has conflicting interests in corporate transaction).
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of Section 690 applies as to the manner of director conduct, provided no
conflict of interest or other loyalty implicating factor is involved. An addi-
tional issue exists as to the proper recipients of director loyalty in that context.
The interpretive issue is actually a complex policy issue: Whether, in the end-
stage context, "best interests of the corporation" means best interests of the
common shareholders only or some other broader set of "corporate" interests.
The answer to that important social policy debate, the so-called Revlon issue,
lies not in Section 690 itself but must be found, not unexpectedly, in the richer
social materials shaping both judicial imagination and interpretation.'
Directors of Virginia corporations should be under a general duty of
disclosure to shareholders. This duty will only take on more importance in the
years ahead as investors rightly clamor for full and accurate corporate infor-
mation. To be sure, the questior, of the proper scope or content of required
disclosure to shareholders is, in some respects, a business judgment. The
prior question of whether disclosure is required, however, and, on balance,
even whether such disclosure as was made is sufficient, is better regarded as
a legal judgment not falling solely within the coverage of Section 690. Judges
must develop the shape and reach of this duty using the case-by-case common
law method.
The above recapitulation is partially normative and not purely descrip-
tive. This is because the recent Willard decision is at odds with portions of
the above summary and, in this author's view, Willard wrongly finds Section
690 to glibly answer the important loyalty and Revlon issues raised in that
case. With that exception, however, the above recapitulation sets forth current
legal demands on directors of Virginia corporations. As can be seen, consid-
erably more than "good faith" is required. Directors have a right to be told
this by their attorneys.
228. As Holmes expressed this idea long ago: "The first requirement of a sound body of
law is, that it should it correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong." OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (Dover
Publications 1991) (1881). For an example of this idea in the context of director obligations,
see generally Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 865 (1990) (examining social expectations of publicly held
business corporations as expressed in Delaware judicial decisions concerning hostile corporate
takeover bids).
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